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ABSTRACT
AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING INFORMATION SHARING
AMONG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
By Scott Driskill Bransford
May 2012
The purpose of the present study was to investigate using survey data to
find factors or barriers which contributed to local law enforcement participation
and support of intelligence information sharing. Following the September 11,
2001, attacks in New York City and Arlington, Virginia, new homeland security
initiatives and directives were created from the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government. Several new initiatives and directives
provided new communication opportunities for partnerships between all levels of
law enforcement to combat the future threat of domestic terrorism.
The evaluation literature indicated that a majority of post-9/11, initiatives,
including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, were strategically
implemented using a top-down, reactive approach to terrorism-related
intelligence gathering. Technological, organizational, or cultural breakdowns
between the federated jurisdictions of law enforcement contributed to the
vulnerability of United States defense capabilities. Disparate pieces of
intelligence information were available to several federal, state, and local terror
investigation agencies, but the agencies were not able to piece together the
information in a timely manner.
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The study examined implementation issues from a bottom-up perspective
with participant local law enforcement departments in four separate states,
across four geographic areas of the country. In order to examine these issues,
responses of participants in the study were analyzed through the administration
of a survey instrument. Participants also were provided an optional opportunity to
provide qualitative data on the last page of the survey instrument. One of the
goals of the study was to identify barriers so a more proactive approach with
more partnerships can be implemented through the development of a seamless
communicative network where terror information can be shared interoperable
across all levels of law enforcement.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the term homeland security became a
common reference for American citizens with regard to efforts to combat
terrorism (Lansford, Pauley, & Covarrubias, 2006). After 9/11, agents from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (IANS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked in
conjunction with local municipalities to track potential suspects. Federal, state,
and local agencies quickly gathered information regarding the localities and
activities of the alleged 9/11 terrorists, but failed to fully and completely
discriminate critical intelligence information contained within each agency
(Sullivan, 2005).
Following 9/11, the Bush Administration undertook an extensive
reorganization of governmental organizational structures. On October 8, 2001,
President George W. Bush established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
within the Executive Office of the President as well as a Homeland Security
Council (HCS). Both the OHS and HCS were established to coordinate efforts
relating to all aspects of terrorism. With the creation of the OHS and HCS,
information sharing efforts among federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies have become a possibility (Relyea, 2004).
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On November 19, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Office of Homeland Security, 2002) for the purpose of creating the
Department of Homeland Security. The overall mission of the Department of
Homeland Security was to successfully merge 22 separate agencies with
separate missions into one agency that incorporates all aspects of
counterterrorism. The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (HSIA, 2002)
represented a more detailed strategic plan in an effort to clearly define the roles
and responsibilities of each government agency. The primary goal was to expand
the sharing of homeland security information among federal intelligence and law
enforcement agencies with state and local law enforcement agencies. Provisions
contained within the HSIA state the following:


The federal government is mandated by the United States Constitution
to protect every state from invasion, which includes terrorist attacks.



State and local law enforcement personnel should have access to
homeland security information. The information shared should be
balanced with the need to preserve the classified status of each
document, as well as to protect the sources and methods used to
acquire the information.



Security clearances should be granted to certain state and local
personnel in order to facilitate the sharing of information regarding
specific terrorist threats among federal, state, and local levels of
government.
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State and local law enforcement personnel should possess the
capability to gather information on suspicious activities and terrorist
threats not possessed by federal intelligence agencies.



Information systems, including the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System and the Terrorist Threat Warning System,
should continue to be developed in order to achieve rapid sharing of
sensitive and unclassified information among federal, state, and local
entities.



A singular, national terrorism database between federal, state, and
local law enforcement should be established to avoid duplication of
existing information systems (HSIA, 2002).

The HSIA (2002) overwhelmingly passed in the House of Representatives
by a vote of 422 to 2. Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA), who coauthored
the bill with Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), believed the bill almost unanimously
passed because it offered a systematic approach to information sharing, which, if
implemented before 9/11, may have prevented the attacks. Harman states,
It is my sincere belief that proper information sharing might have
prevented 9/11. Without such systems, dots that could be connected to
save American lives are left scattered across various intelligence
agencies. This bill helps solve two critical problems: information sharing
between the FBI and CIA, and sharing between the federal government
and local first responders like mayors, police and firefighters. (The Virtual
Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman, 2002, para. 3)
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Although most intelligence concerning suspected terrorists is accumulated
at the federal level, state and local law enforcement are the agencies most likely
to encounter domestic terrorists. During a congressional hearing that preceded
the creation of the HSIA (2002), Congresswoman Harman (The Virtual Office of
Congresswoman Jane Harman, 2002) noted one example of a missed
opportunity. Two days prior to the 9/11 attacks, one of the hijackers was stopped
for speeding by a Maryland State Trooper. The officer did not detain the suspect
because he was not aware the individual was listed on the CIA watch list of
suspected terrorists (The Virtual Office of Congresswoman Jane Harman, 2002).
The inquiry conducted by the 9/11 commission raised new issues
involving the lack of cooperation and information sharing on all levels of law
enforcement. Specifically in question was the investigation strategy concerning
the activities of two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdar and Nawaf Alhazmi. Both
suspects lived in San Diego, California, and rented a room from a man who was
reportedly an undercover FBI informant. The National Security Agency (NSA)
first learned the identities of the two terrorist suspects and their connections to
Al-Qaeda in 1999 through intercepted communications in the Middle East. The
CIA detained the men in 2000, after both suspects attended a meeting of AlQaeda operatives in Malaysia, and learned of Alhazmi traveling to Los Angeles,
California in March 2000. However, intelligence information involving the case
was scattered among several different government agencies, and was not linked
until after the 9/11 attack. In August 2001, both suspects were added to a watch

5
list in order to prevent entry into the United States. However, by this date both
were residing in the United States in preparation for the 9/11 attacks (Emerson,
2002).
On December 16, 2006, the Executive Office of the President released
Guideline 2, a Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
for the purpose of the prevention of domestic terrorism. The directive initiated a
common strategic framework which assigned roles and communication
responsibilities to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The
memorandum called for interoperable sharing of terrorism information, homeland
security information, and law enforcement information between and among
federal, state, and local law enforcement, with the addition of participating
community entities (Office of Homeland Security, 2007).
The President’s memorandum recognized the importance of state and
local law enforcement as crucial to United States counterterrorism efforts, as
local law enforcement comprises many of the first responders to a domestic
attack. The 9/11 attack demonstrated the possibility that foreign terrorists already
could reside in local communities as future domestic targets are identified. The
federal government expressed concern regarding the rising threat posed by
individual homegrown terrorists drawing inspiration from established global
terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaida. Whether a plan for a terrorist attack
originates in the United States or overseas, critical intelligence information is
obtained by local police officers during the course of routine law enforcement
activities (Office of Homeland Security, 2007).
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The memorandum further directed state and local police departments to
deliver counterterrorism responsibilities in addition to core missions, including the
protection of public health and safety, as well as to provide emergency and nonemergency services. While state and local law enforcement work to prevent
future terrorist attacks, the performance of routine duties must continue, including
response to service calls and confronting all types of public health and safety
issues. Counterterrorism success is dependent upon the development of strong
partnerships with the public. This relationship needs to be constructed based
upon a fundamental level of communication and trust between local police and
members of the community (Adams, Rohe, & Accury, 2002; Chappell, 2009).
New partnerships could be created and utilized in conjunction with ongoing
policing activities in order to protect communities with the additional involvement
of key community representatives (Office of Homeland Security, 2007).
The memorandum acknowledged the needs of state and local agencies in
an attempt to comprehensively incorporate counterterrorism and homeland
security activities with federal law enforcement agencies. Specifically, it required
local law enforcement access to timely, credible, and actionable intelligence
disseminated among all levels of law enforcement. The memorandum
recommended an organizational culture change in law enforcement which
recognized the importance of fusing information regarding all crimes with national
security implications. The organizational change included the development of
training, task forces, and law enforcement strategy designed to address terrorist
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strategies and capabilities through improvement of improved information sharing
processes (Office of Homeland Security, 2007).
One of the findings of the 9/11 Commission was the recommendation of a
federally mandated approach to information sharing originating from the federal
to the local level. Guideline 2 disagreed with the 9/11 Commission’s findings, and
instead recognized the criticality of local law enforcement support and
participation in any proposed counterterrorism strategy. Guideline 2 recognized
the prevention of attack strategies similar to 9/11 would have to be initiated from
the local level to the federal level, using a bottom-to-top approach when
necessary. The participation of law enforcement agencies on all levels is
essential to the development of an interoperable network which would allow for
seamless communication. The strategic development of an interoperable
communication system would be mandatory, and local law enforcement’s
participation would need to be compulsory for the development of such a system
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004; Office of Homeland Security,
2007).
Statement of the Problem
There are several problems that are barriers to intelligence information
sharing among the federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement. First, the
organizational structure of local law enforcement must be overhauled from
traditional, militaristic policing agencies, which have historically operated as a
closed organization, to a more open organization capable of operating in a
problem-solving capacity (Goldstein, 1979). Doherty (2006) stated local law
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enforcement must integrate homeland security initiatives into a proactive,
community-style approach. Counterterrorism initiatives need to be seamlessly
integrated into everyday policing activities, while simultaneously changing the
traditional organizational police structure for the purpose of better communication
protocol. The outdated militaristic style of policing must be replaced by
community-oriented policing initiatives, implemented with the strategic goal of
better communication strategies among all levels of law enforcement. Chappell
(2009) referred to the implementation of new proactive policing initiatives as
uneven, at best, specifically during the initial and implementation stages of the
process.
Second, from a federal perspective, the United States employs a
federated governmental structure which organizes law enforcement agencies
and departments into separate layers (federal, state, and local) according to
invisible jurisdictional boundaries (Relyea, 2004). The federated structure
contains bureaucratic fiefdoms and secrecy that promote politics over substance.
Prior to 9/11, each layer of law enforcement operated in relative isolation
(Lansford et al., 2006). The majority of intelligence investigations are conducted
with minimal communication and assistance from other agencies (Riley &
Hoffman, 1995).
The concept of change requires a new set of directives for every police
officer in the agency, as well as an overall organizational transformation of police
culture. A shift from traditional to a community policing paradigm within police
organizations may affect the morale and productivity of individual officers. New
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training programs must be developed to guide local line officers through the
process of sharing intelligence information with state and federal law
enforcement agencies, and to become proficient at new responsibilities. Line
officers must be prepared to handle the investigative, technical, and analytical
aspects of information sharing. The future of law enforcement and, specifically,
the rapid advancement of technology demands line officers possess the
analytical skills necessary to successfully conduct domestic terrorism
investigations.
Roberts (2006) stated technological change must accompany
organizational change if comprehensive intelligence information sharing is to
occur. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006) stated prior to
the 9/11 attacks, a standardized communication system was not operational,
which resulted in an inferior and disjointed information sharing process.
Traditionally, public safety agencies developed and acquired communication
systems solely for individual agency usage, with no strategic planning for wider
compatibility. Communication failures, resulting in non-existent situational
awareness among first responders, increased the magnitude of the disaster of
9/11 and greatly restricted relief efforts. Rapid, effectual response to a
catastrophic event is predicated on a reliable communication system capable of
maintaining situational awareness and command-and-control functions between
responding agencies. Currently, such a technological system that can seamlessly
connect all levels of law enforcement does not exist (GAO, 2006). Modern
investigative tools such as cellular phones, e-mails, the Internet, and other
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wireless devices all are critical components of a successful interoperable
information sharing system that must be incorporated into a single network.
The 9/11 Commission stated a single database needs to be implemented
including a vertical, bottom-up approach that encompasses all levels of law
enforcement. Information sharing initiatives cannot be successful without the full
support of rank and file police officers, officers on daily patrol who work with the
community to obtain the most accurate assessment of criminal enterprises.
Goldstein (1990) stated rank and file police officers are an invaluable resource in
helping to solve community problems as well as large social problems. Goldstein
(1990) believed solicitation of rank and file police officers is an excellent way to
begin to solve any policing or societal problem. Rank and file officers offer
opinions based on their experience of hundreds to thousands of individual cases,
and offer a mix of hard facts, rich insights, and strong opinions. Goldstein (1990)
believed that as scholars, there exists an ethical obligation to assess all police
opinions through careful examination, and to never underestimate the enormity of
their contributions.
As in the case of 9/11, even though the Constitution states the federal
government is responsible for the protection of the United States, police officers
at the local levels are most likely to confront a domestic terrorist. The reality of
police work is even the most ambitious and well planned initiatives cannot be
achieved if police officers entrusted with the delivery of new initiatives believe
their time could be better utilized in other areas of enforcement. Therefore, local
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police officers provide the most critical link to an information system capable of
vertical and horizontal communication between agencies.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is to examine through survey data the
organizational, political, and technical barriers that contribute to local law
enforcement sharing relevant terrorist information with other law enforcement
agencies. Following 9/11, new homeland security initiatives were created by the
executive and legislative branches of the United States government. These
initiatives provided new communication opportunities for partnerships between
local and federal law enforcement, with the explicit purpose of the protection of
the United States homeland.
The results of this study provide further insight for police chiefs and
personnel of local agencies regarding the perceptions of both law enforcement
officers and technology personnel as to whether information sharing initiatives
are viewed as a priority. If the level of interest is high, the probability of the future
achievement of a comprehensive information sharing network becomes a serious
possibility.
In addition, this study focused on the level of interest among rank and file
law enforcement officers that are entrusted with performing the majority of work
in the field. The reality of police work is even the most ambitious and wellplanned initiatives will not be achieved if the officers entrusted with delivery of
police services believe their time could be better utilized in other areas of
enforcement. This study identified potential barriers as well as determined
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indicators for successful information sharing. If significant barriers to information
can be overcome with the input and support of workers critical to the
achievement of these goals, it follows that participation and growth of future
intelligence information sharing programs will be advanced by this study, as well
as future studies.
Justification of the Study
The reality of early 21st century terrorism has propelled the future of
American policing into a new era, characterized by an emphasis on homeland
security (Oliver, 2007). International terrorists thousands of miles from American
soil have proven with the attack of 9/11 that the most pervasive and evil acts are
now possible with the utilization of modern technology. Paradoxically, the attacks
of 9/11 have accelerated the technological advancement possibilities concerning
the mobilization of American police forces. The future of policing in the United
States demands the proactivity, not reactivity, of all levels of law enforcement
working together within the framework of an interoperable communication
system. This study is justified by its emphasis on the future course of modern
American policing, specifically the identification of barriers that prohibit the free
flow of intelligence information across all levels of United States law
enforcement. This study advocates and encourages the discussion critical to the
implementation of proactive, futuristic police techniques, such as information
sharing, crime analysis, and community problem-solving, all critical policing tools
for the prevention of future domestic terrorist attacks.
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Limitations of the Study
There were several limitations to this study. First, the study was completed
with the utilization of a convenience sample as opposed to a random sample.
Piquero and Hickman (1999) stated the use of convenience samples in
criminological studies has been the subject of debate among practitioners
(Hagan & McCarthy, 1997; Jenson, Erikson, & Gibbs, 1978). The primary issue
to samples of convenience has been the issue of representativeness. Piquero
and Hickman stated a limited sample assessment should be eligible for
utilization, provided the sample directly relates to police officers speaking to the
policing profession. According to Piquero and Hickman, police officers can be
easily conceptualized in a convenience sample because this study was directly
related to police officers and attitudes and perceptions of their own work. Piquero
and Hickman state as long as the data is collected with questions geared toward
such as sample, the resulting information gleaned from the study should be able
to meet at least a minimum threshold resulting in preliminary scientific evidence
regarding local law enforcement officers and their perceived support of
information sharing initiatives.
Piquero and Hickman (1999) added the most vital need in any evaluation
of a new area of study is the systematic collection of data. The use of a
convenience sample in an experimental study presents a unique opportunity for
subsequent researchers to build on the results of this study with future research,
which may affirmatively influence the direction of research in subsequent years.

14
Issues Concerning Internal Validity
With regard to internal and external validity, Campbell and Stanley (1966)
published the first scientific explanation of internal validity in modern research.
Internal validity is critical to the integrity of this study because low internal validity
represents plausible alternative explanations for the real factors underlying
support of intelligence information sharing initiatives. Campbell’s and Stanley’s
original research involved the educational field and specifically addressed the
issue of how new educational programs could be infused into school
environments. They stated the tenants of interval validity, and provided
recommendations for solving internal validity problems with the aid of appropriate
research techniques. Campbell and Stanley also categorized internal validity into
categories of threats, which they identified as time related threats, selection
threats, and threats of subject reactivity.
Campbell’s and Stanley’s (1966) concept of history is applicable to the
possible threats to internal validity in this study. History refers to events which
occur outside the control of the research setting, which may affect participants’
responses in regard to their support of information sharing. Law enforcement’s
opinion of intelligence information sharing is shaped, in part, by the catastrophic
events of 9/11 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The 9/11 attack
is widely recognized as the largest assault to the homeland in the history of the
United States. If another major attack were to occur during the formulation of this
study, this would represent a serious threat to internal validity of the proposed
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study. According to Campbell and Stanley, there is no available research
technique that could be employed to overcome this situation.
Another time threat to internal validity is what Cook and Campbell (1979)
refer to as the concept of maturation. Maturation refers to natural changes that
occur in the participants of studies over a period of time. As time passes from the
tragic events of 9/11, law enforcements’ support of intelligence information
sharing could decrease based on the fact a major attack has not taken place in
the United States since 2001. This researcher acknowledges there is a possibility
that law enforcement personnel could believe other programs are more important
to their communities based on the rationalization that no major terror attack has
occurred domestically in over a decade.
Cook and Campbell (1979) additionally warned selection bias could occur
when participants are not randomly selected, and instead are allowed to
volunteer. These procedures can result in threats to internal validity because
there may be substantial differences between those participants who decide to
complete the survey and those who do not. Subjects who volunteer also can
differ concerning a number of personal characteristics from those subjects who
did not volunteer. For example, a study conducted by Rosenthal and Rosnow
(1991) revealed subjects who tend to volunteer for studies (among other
attributes) tend to be better educated, possess a higher I.Q., be more selfdisclosing, and be more sociable.
Another threat to internal validity is found in the concept of reactivity.
Whitley (1996) stated reactivity is a danger to internal validity because subjects
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may change their behavior and react to the social situation surrounding the study
rather than to the study itself. Subjects may adopt and change responses to the
survey based on what they believe the researcher wants to report. In this study,
the potential for reactivity was addressed by giving subjects a paper-pencil test,
thus removing participants from an artificial, laboratory setting. In addition,
subjects were given adequate time to respond to the survey questions. Finally,
no face-to-face contact occurred between the subject and this researcher, thus
minimizing the opportunity for reactivity.
Threats to External Validity
Cook and Campbell (1979) state that the concept of external validity can
be expressed by answering the question of how broadly the findings in a study
apply, while being simultaneously conducted under a wide-ranging set of
conditions. Cook and Campbell refer to this term as simply the “generalizability of
findings” (p. 42). Vidmar (1979) was more specific with the definition of external
validity, dividing the concept into three distinct subgroups he called structural,
functional, and conceptual components.
Vidmar (1979) described the structural component of external validity as
the component which focuses on the methodology of a study. In this study, an
effort was made to expand the generalizability of the study by increasing the
number of police departments in the study to four, and also by increasing the
scope of the study to include police departments in four distinct areas of the
country. Regional police departments around the United States have different
standard operating procedures and cultural norms that potentially may influence
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whether the results of this study are relevant in the presence of these individual
departmental differences.
Whitley (1996) stated external validity can be strengthened by increasing
the overall generalizability, meaning the results can be compared from one
department to another. It is an advantage of this study to be able to collect and
analyze data from both across and between sites. By collecting data across sites,
this researcher collected and analyzed the data as one set, across all four sites.
By also collecting the data between the respective law enforcement departments,
this researcher collected and analyzed the research individually for each
department, and then the individual departments allowed for comparisons to be
drawn from one department to another. By taking this approach, threats to
external validity were minimized but not entirely eliminated. However, even after
increasing the number and scope of the study, this researcher acknowledges
generalizability issues remain, which never can be completely controlled. There
may be differences within the departments, even with a significant increase in the
number of departments participating in the survey.
The functional element of external validity refers to the degree to which
the psychological processes that operate in a study are similar to the
psychological processes at work in a particular natural setting. Because this
study occurred in a non-laboratory field setting, the threat to external validity was
minimized in relation to the functional aspect. However, this researcher
acknowledges a survey contains its own set of limitations as a research
technique. It is possible that subjects failed to respond honestly when completing
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pen-paper tests. Law enforcement personnel may have injected their own beliefs
as to the manner of which they are expected to think and behave in an artificially
constructed research setting. This researcher attempted to minimize this type of
behavior by ensuring confidentiality for all participants who volunteered to
participate in the survey. By ensuring confidentiality, participants felt more
comfortable to report truthfully.
An example of this type of threat to external validity is commonly referred
to as the Hawthorne Effect. Adair (1984) defined the Hawthorne Effect as a
problem in research experiments where human subjects’ behavior is modified
because the subjects in the study possess the knowledge that they are in
experiment. Gottfredson (1996) theorized that criminal justice studies are more
vulnerable to the Hawthorne Effect because law enforcement personnel
generally seek to improve performance and solicit supervisory feedback if it will
advance their careers. Also, Gottfredson stated law enforcement tends to offer
promotion reviews for organizational personnel at a much slower pace than other
professions. Gottfredson believed frequent reviews and job feedback are crucial
to controlling for the Hawthorne Effect in all types of action research. The
rationale is if law enforcement personnel are satisfied with their supervision, they
are significantly less likely to alter their behavior in a research setting.
Whitley (1996) described the conceptual component of external validity as
the degree to which the problem statement corresponds to problems considered
important in a natural setting. Threats to external validity are minimized
conceptually, in part, because the research presented in this study is of practical
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relevance to law enforcement and the tasks police officers perform. The focus of
this study on intelligence information sharing is directly related to the law
enforcement profession and is a crucial component to the additional
responsibility required of law enforcement in the 21st century. The results of this
study are of direct benefit to law enforcement in the future delivery of their job
duties.
Assumptions of the Study
The process of conducting social research required this researcher to
make basic assumptions. It is important that this researcher recognize the
assumptions made, which may or may not mitigate the research findings. In
developing the conceptual and methodological framework for this study, the
following assumptions were made:


The participants in the study answered the survey questions as
honesty as possible.



The individual, organizational, and technological barriers identified in
the study can be inferred to represent other settings and or other forms
of organizational change.



This researcher, through the implementation of the applied research
methodology, was able to accurately identify the most important issues
to local line law enforcement officers as it relates to sharing intelligence
information.
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The survey instrument utilized in the study represented an accurate
and reliable means to access local law enforcement attitudes,
opinions, and experiences.



The data collection procedures outlined in the Methods section of this
study were able to be carried out as planned.
Summary

Chapter I introduced the importance of the study. The background,
purpose statement, and significance of the problem created a roadmap for the
study. The research questions and hypotheses provide grounding for the
direction of the study. Finally, issues concerning internal and external validity, as
well as assumptions and limitations of the study provide an additional foundation
for comprehending the research.
The problem presented in this study is the identification of organizational,
environmental, and technical barriers to the implementation of intelligence
information sharing initiatives. Specifically, this study examined the effect these
barriers have on local police officers as a determination is made to support
proactive techniques needed to join federal, state, and local law enforcement
together for the purpose of domestic terrorism prevention. The quantitative study
examined the relationship between barriers to information sharing (Akbulut,
2003) and local police support of intelligence information sharing initiatives
(Lyons, 2002).
Chapter I contained an introduction of the basic concepts of this study.
Chapter II presents a review of literature related to the research questions and
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hypotheses of this study. The literature review included an examination of the
background surrounding the transformation from reactive to proactive policing
strategy needed to prevent future terrorist attacks. In addition, police subculture
is discussed to determine why the sharing of information both between and
among agencies has been historically limited. Finally, technical barriers are
examined to explain the difficulty in the establishment of an interoperable
network, which would connect all levels of law enforcement together to aid in
both investigative and emergency first responder situations.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Chapter I presented an overview of the problem: the barriers to the
development of a comprehensive intelligence information sharing initiative across
all levels of law enforcement. The purpose of this experimental study was to
understand the lived experiences of local law enforcement officers as it relates to
skills and strategies needed to implement information sharing initiatives. The
conclusions derived from the current research study provide law enforcement
leaders on all levels of government an understanding of the motivating factors of
line officers in performance of their daily job assignments. Specifically, this study
examined the local law enforcement officers’ willingness to share investigative
information with other law enforcement agencies.
The literature review presented in Chapter II summarizes theoretical and
empirical studies that provide the background necessary for understanding
important aspects of information sharing. A clearer understanding of the barriers
law enforcement agencies confront in the establishment of improved
communication is necessary to develop comprehensive counterterrorism
strategy. These barriers need to be overcome to advance the efficient and
accurate facilitation of intelligence information across all levels of law
enforcement.
Classical organizational theory and modern structural organization theory
are discussed with the goal of demonstrating how the application of the tenants
of these theories can help overcome information sharing barriers. The
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organizational section articulates how government bureaucracies were created
and, specifically, how operational strategies evolved as a barrier to information
sharing. Goldstein (1990) stated that enforcement agencies need to reevaluate
organizational structure and engage in proactive policing styles, which would
encourage communication and contribute to the solution of serious societal
problems. Lansford et al. (2006) stated to date there is not a comprehensive,
proactive information sharing strategy for the development of accurate and
efficient sharing of information across all levels of law enforcement.
Documentation
The following literature represents extensive research of peer-reviewed
journals, books, and dissertations authored by scholars in the fields of criminal
justice, sociology, and public administration. Electronic database search engines
were utilized to identify studies that increased awareness of the barriers involved
in the implementation of information sharing initiatives. Electronic database
search topics include the key words police, terrorism, homeland security,
administrative theory, organization structure, and barriers to organizational
communication. Research studies included sources determined by the author to
be most applicable to increasing the knowledge of intelligence information
sharing.
Classical Organizational Theory
The tenets and assumptions of classical organizational theory are rooted
in the British Industrial Revolution of the 1700s (Shafritz & Ott, 2001). Classical
organizational theory is comprised of three distinct aspects identified as
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bureaucratic, scientific, management. The examination of bureaucratic aspects
embedded within public government agencies reveals barriers that must be
addressed in order to deliver efficient communicative interoperability between
and among all levels of law enforcement. These tenants evolved and expanded
over three centuries to provide insight into the philosophy of government agency
management, as well as to explain the philosophical tenants that govern
communicative strategy. Classical organizational theory described the manner in
which organizations maximize efficiency and productivity in all aspects of service
delivery, including communication networks.
The classical organizational model is connected to aspects implicit in all
types of organizations, including police organizations (Radalet & Carter, 1994).
Organizational theorists believed productive service methods could be
determined via scientific inquiry, which studied specific work processes in order
to systematically streamline tasks to maximize effectiveness (Shafritz & Ott,
2001). Organizational theory could be utilized to determine the most efficient way
to deliver services in an organizational environment (Gulick, 1937; March &
Simon, 1958; Simon, 2000; F. Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1978).
Study of Bureaucratic Organizations
Weber’s (1978) work on bureaucracy defined the manner in which future
public agencies communicate and organize resources. Stark (2004) defined
bureaucracy as “the existence of a specialized administrative staff” (p. 38).
Weber stated bureaucracy involved a particular type of administrative structure
developed through legitimized authority and supported by strict discipline. The

25
goal of a bureaucratic organization was to increase organizational efficiency,
which allowed for the expansion of organizational services. Weber’s bureaucratic
model advanced traditional organizational structures, and Weber believed
jurisdictional areas should be clearly specified, with specific instructions assigned
from superiors. Each task is perfected through the repetition of process, which,
over time, maximizes efficiency. Communication within the organization followed
hierarchal principles in which subordinates were required to follow orders
explicitly from their immediate supervisor, which created a narrow unity of
command. Bureaucracy linked formal and informal communication networks that
connected organizational actors to one another through information flows.
Internal rules govern all decisions within the organization, and all decisions are
recorded in permanent files to form a communicative framework (Weber, 1978).
Historically, bureaucracy has been synonymous with large government
agencies (Goodsell, 1983). Efficiency of communication in government agencies
depends upon the efficient utilization of bureaucracy. The presence of
bureaucracy creates both opportunities for sharing information and barriers to the
implementation of new networks between federal and local agencies. Just as
improved federal and local relations underlie an improved counterterrorism effort,
information sharing is predicated on the improved construction and utilization of
bureaucratic structures. The process of managing and controlling bureaucracy is
an important first step in the implementation of any new government initiatives
(Goodsell, 1983).
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Daniels (2009) stated bureaucracy has evolved to represent the
collectivity of government offices (called bureaus by officials) which comprised
the permanent governance of the state. The term bureaucracy encompasses all
public positions in public administration. Included are federal, state, and local
members of both supervisory and line status, including officials who are both
elected and appointed. The creation of improved interagency information sharing
practices for the purpose of preventing domestic terrorist attacks is one of the
critical aspects of current public policy initiatives involving the application of
bureaucracy. Weber’s (1978) bureaucratic theory contained practical
organizational element, applicable to addressing serious social problems, such
as domestic terrorism. However, scholars have historically viewed bureaucracy
as a barrier to implementation and not as a blueprint for efficient public
organizations (Benson & Rosenberg, 1960; Hummel, 1977; Merton, 1990; G.
Peters, 2001).
Classical Organizational Theory and Scientific Management
Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911) provided a significant amount of literature
regarding the scientific component of classical organizational theory. Taylor
theorized the application of scientific management could produce an efficient
organization through dedication to a one best way approach. The process
inherently demanded the meticulous assessment of every detail in the delivery of
service. Taylor believed strict adherence to scientific management theory served
as a prerequisite to organizational efficiency from the standpoint of minimizing
waste while maximizing productivity. Each step was refined until a preferred
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method was acknowledged as organizational benchmark procedure. For these
reasons, scientific management, specifically the one best way approach, was
employed from a strategic perspective by a majority of private businesses and
public agencies at the turn of the 20th century, including police organizations
(Palmiotto, 2000, p. 111).
Scientific management also addresses communicative techniques, which
can disseminate the most efficient, timely, and accurate information possible.
Currently, no unified scientific management approach exists that allows law
enforcement agencies to share information within a singular network. Moreover,
an interoperable system, operating within the proscribed one best way approach,
does not exist, which connects the federal, state, and law enforcement together
for counterterrorism tasks of emergency response or for counterterrorism
investigative purposes.
The 9/11 Commission determined the federal government in conjunction
with state and local departments lacked a unified strategy for the sharing of
intelligence information (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The
result in the decade following 9/11 has been a fragmented, disjointed, process,
where each state in conjunction with participating local law enforcement entered
into separate agreements with the federal government. The federal government
waited, whether by choice or by bureaucratic inaction, to determine which
individual state and local plans possessed merit before attempting to commit to a
comprehensive strategic plan on a national level.
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Relyea (2004) labeled the government’s approach to information sharing
as a flawed strategy consisting of bureaucratic fiefdoms, a veritable patchwork of
agencies from all levels. The lack of a unified strategy resulted in a hodgepodge
of laws, regulations, and initiative strategies scattered among all levels of law
enforcement. Principles of scientific management have not been applied to
counterterrorism efforts, and the result is a disorganized approach fraught with
widespread miscommunication.
Taylor’s (1911) scientific management provided a potentially useful
strategic blueprint from both continuity and efficiency standpoints involving
information sharing practices. The 9/11 committee recommended a similar
strategic approach, with a common set of standards applied to all levels of law
enforcement. The 9/11 Commission recognized without a unified plan, the
application of efficient modern technology would not be achieved, and
government delivery of information sharing objectives would remain in serious
jeopardy (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 23).
Gulick (1937) developed a system within classical organizational theory
that expanded Taylor’s (1911) scientific management theory while also
contributing to the efficiency of overall police organizational work patterns. Gulick
stated the efficiency of an organization lies within the division of labor of the
members. The laborers are organized according to a unity of command structure
where, as in the case of law enforcement, each officer reports up the chain of
command to one designated supervisor. The consistent application of unity of
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command results in more accurate and reliable information communication both
between and among law enforcement agencies.
Simon’s (2000) research on administration processes was considered by
scholars to be a seminal work in the development of the administrative
component of the classical organizational school of thought. Simon theorized
administrative efficiency increased due to the specialization of group tasks.
Group tasks arranged by supervisors comprised a strict hierarchy of authority
model within the organization. Simon stated administrative efficiency increased
by limiting the span of control at any point in the organizational hierarchy to a
small number by grouping the workers, for purposes of control, purpose, place,
and clientele (p. 39).
Simon’s (2000) administrative efficiency concept was amplified by
arranging the members of the group in a determinative structure of authority.
Simon supported Gulick’s concept of unity of command, but cautioned that when
tasks become highly specialized, a supervisor may not possess the necessary
expertise to oversee a subordinate’s work. Simon concluded this principle could
be utilized if presented in a truncated form. If two authoritative commands
conflict, a single determinate person should be identified whom the subordinate
is expected to obey (Simon, 2000, p. 43).
The application of administrative theories of Gulick’s (1937) and Simon’s
(2000) system provides a dilemma for local police administrators attempting to
implement intelligence information sharing initiatives. Police labor practices must
be specialized where individual line officers are knowledgeable and possess
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skills necessary to conduct information sharing responsibilities. Local police
officers must be trained to analyze and identify which information is important,
and report the information within a predetermined strategic communicative
structure. However, police counterterrorism labor must also be organized within
an open communicative system because all officers within the agency could be
knowingly or unknowingly in possession of critical terrorism investigation
information. The attacks of 9/11 proved disjointed pieces of information could
become critical when investigated in totality with other pieces of intelligence
(Oliver, 2007).
Classical Organizational Theory and Traditional Policing Management
Traditional policing model of policing advances classical scientific
management in three critical administrative areas. All three areas have a
profound effect on communication between and among law enforcement
agencies. As previously stated, police agencies and the application of scientific
management techniques are concerned with efficiency and accuracy involving
the communicative work product of a given organizational structure. Second, the
application of traditional policing incorporates principles of the scientific method
by which its application and practice can operate within rapidly expanding
government bureaucracies. Finally, bureaucratic principles and scientific
management practices are inherently reactive in nature. Policing strategy is
generally approached from a micro viewpoint concerned with specific processes
of police activity, not a comprehensive approach that connects organizations

31
together in order to address information sharing and counterterrorism strategy
from a unified standpoint (Goldstein, 1990).
Bureaucratic Models and Traditional Policing
Perrow (1967) believed the bureaucratic model was applicable to police
organizations at the micro level because most large local metropolitan police
forces were shaped like a hierarchal pyramid. The pyramid structure was
prohibitive to efficient communication in large departments because bureaucratic
layers separated police administrators from line officers. Police organizations
shared with the bureaucratic model a rigid chain of command, standard operating
procedures whose purpose is to dictate protocol, and adherence to a military
structure, including military titles and discipline. The organizational hierarchy
dictated the communication flow since information traveled from the top to the
bottom in a typical police chain of command structure. In regard to local law
enforcement, a significant amount of administrative delay occurs as intelligence
information travels upward through authority levels. Information traditionally has
been shared from the top-down; for example, from the CIA, to the FBI, and on to
state and local authorities.
As noted in The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), prior to the Al Qaeda attacks, the intelligence
information flow on all levels of law enforcement was inadequate. A top-down
approach denigrates the value of information gathered by state and local
authorities, which is imperative to counter-terrorist operations. The 9/11
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Commission agreed improved information sharing practices can improve law
enforcement communication by simultaneously managing bureaucracy while
expediting decision-making processes. Therefore, it is critical for law
enforcement agencies to distance themselves from the traditional hierarchal
administration structure in favor of collaborative proactive processes, which
includes seamless communication across all levels of law enforcement
(Goldstein, 1987; Ratcliffe, 2003; Tilley, 2004).
Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd (2004) stated Weber’s concept of
authority was essential to the progression of police evolving from reactive to
proactive organizations. Weber’s (1978) authority was prevalent in police
agencies on the subject of rank hierarchy, as well as police work accountability.
The hierarchal structures were similar to legal-rational authority principles
espoused by Weber. Police supervisors exhibit legal rational authority over
subordinates, and orders are communicated directly down the chain of command
hierarchy.
Police agencies have employed many of Weber’s (1978) bureaucratic
concepts, which has been a criticism for scholars questioning the outcomes of
reactive styles of police service while simultaneously questioning the benefits
bureaucracy can provide (Mastrofski, 1998). Bureaucracy has been scrutinized
by scholars for the myriad of bureaucratic dysfunctions, the same type of
criticism historically attributed to hierarchal public agencies. Goldstein (1979)
stated, bureaucracy “places greater emphasis on their organization and
operating methods within the organization, and less on the substantive outcome
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of their work” (p. 236). Examples of bureaucratic dysfunction include the fixation
on rules and regulations, and a pervasive clinical attitude unresponsive to
societal problems (Eck & Newell, 1987; Mastrofski, 1998; Sparrow, Moore, &
Kennedy, 1990; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1999).
Kim and Bretschneider (2004) found bureaucracies operated most
efficiently based upon an established pre-determined protocol of handling a
specific investigative situation, which is why the study of bureaucracy and
scientific management has been historically linked. By performing the same task
in a repetitious manner, the framework for more efficient communication
networks is established. Kim and Bretschneider reported strict adherence to
internal rules (also referred to as standard operating procedures) significantly
helped local agencies coordinate information. The development of standard
operating procedures helps to minimize organizational interference, which
operates as a barrier to communication. Coordinated protocol also contributed to
an increase in human and non-human communication across state and federally
controlled networks. The study concluded local police organizations were open to
new initiatives, so long as the local bureaucracy maintains input on the delivery
of services to its citizens.
Traditional Policing and Reactivity
Goldstein (1990) explained the managerial strategy of traditional policing
revolved around reactive activities. The traditional method of policing was
comprised of a group of core duties, such as routine patrol, keeping the peace,
and arrest and report writing (Stone & DeLuca, 1994). The traditional
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organizational philosophy, as it related to communication with other agencies,
was severely restrictive and limited by design (Payne & Trojanowicz, 1985).
These types of traditional police strategies developed as natural organizational
barriers to the efficient flow of information sharing (Birzer & Tannehill, 2004).
Few transformational ideas were introduced during the time period
traditional policing tactics gained popularity in the United States. Police officers
working in the traditional organizational structure believed the quickest way to
promotion was to make arrests and to limit response time for the next call of
service. Police officers in this era understood efficient patrol and discipline
practices lead to more arrests, which lead to promotional opportunities for all
officers involved in the organization (Goldstein, 1990).
The traditional organizational relationship is opposite of the core
management principles of law enforcement originally espoused by Sir Robert
Peel, considered to be one of the most important contributors to the traditional
method of policing (Radelet & Carter, 1994). Peel’s policing philosophies (as
cited in Radelet & Carter, 1994) agreed with classical organization theorists from
the standpoint that successful policing was based on efficiency and strict
discipline. However, Peel (as cited in Radelet & Carter, 1994) believed efficiency
could be improved with the application of an inclusive police philosophy, on
which encouraged all. In addition, Peel (as cited in Radelet & Carter, 1994)
believed in the solicitation of public support and cooperation from community
members, considered to be a radical idea for the time period.
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The 9/11 Commission and scholars concluded critical information sharing
barriers, which limited efficiency, could not be solved by the application of
reactive police management (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004).
The traditional model of police operations promoted a territorial organizational
structure that facilitated communication gaps between and among the federated
levels of law enforcement. Therefore, intelligence information could not be
shared efficiently across all levels of federal, state, and local law enforcement.
The traditional model was effective for core police activities, but lacked the
comprehensive strategic procedures needed to evolve with additional
opportunities provided by new technology (Ratcliffe, 2003).
Weisburd and Eck (2004) stated traditional police tactics were not only
inefficient and non-beneficial in traditional core policing areas but were
incompatible with the application of new initiatives and types of police services
that required additional officers. The isolation of individual officers and agencies
hindered the development of cooperative initiatives between and among levels of
law enforcement. The study concluded this type of management procedure
operated as a natural barrier to efficient police services.
Walker (1993) stated security incidents were treated as if occurred in a
vacuum, an isolated occurrence never to be re-investigated. The lack of
coordination and analytical opportunities for capability provided by the traditional
method left police members and the community questioning whether police
operations, as it existed in its traditional form, were capable of ensuring public
safety. Tilley (2004) agreed with Walker who coined the traditional approach, “fire
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brigade policing” (p. 165), warning of the dangers of single case investigation.
The preferred communicative manner would be to link all pieces of information
together in one large database, which could be used for primary and follow-up
investigations. A comprehensive approach would increase communication with
other agencies and allow police to operate in a manner which would strategically
aid long term objectives.
Modern Structural Organization Theory-Proactive Police Communication
In an attempt to reconcile the differences between the traditional and
proactive styles of police management, Burns and Stalker (1994) developed a
majority of the tenants of Modern Structure Theory. Modern structure theory
explored how the two organizational forms interrelated to form an efficient
organizational environment. Burns and Stalker believed both reactive and
proactive styles had a place in a given organizational structure, because each
style had the potential to benefit an organization depending upon the goals and
services provided.
Burns and Stalker (1994) framed the discussion as the mechanical
organization structure versus the organic structure. This debate served as a
template for the efficient management of all types of organizations, including the
modernization of police services. The tenants of modern structural theory are
similar to classical organizational theory, but also included neoclassical
components of human relations with the inclusion of several additional
assumptions.
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Burns and Stalker (1994) stated the most efficient structure of an
organization lies in its objective and natural environmental condition as dictated
by its products and services. Most fundamental problems can be attributed to the
organizational structure, and can be solved by changing the structure. The best
structure of an organization should be determined, in part, by the technological
process involved in the organizational delivery of goods and services (Shafritz &
Ott, 2001).
Burns and Stalker (1994) believed the organic nature of management
systems could be applied to modern business processes. The concept of organic
organizations was synonymous with proactive police policy, making it compatible
with government services operating in rapidly changing societal conditions. The
organic system offered an organization less rigidity, which made the system
adaptable and easily reconciled with the latest technological advancements. The
process involved increased participation and reliance on the workers within the
organizational structure. The organic structure was based upon information and
the networking of information rather than merely following directives issued by
superiors.
A precise definition of community policing has been stated vaguely in the
literature and the subject of much debate among both scholars and practitioners.
Leonard and More (1978) defined community policing as a vague term that
encompassed a broad range of police activities and initiatives. Adams et al.
(2002) and Skogan (2004) explained community policing consisted of an
organizational formula of elements, including organizational decentralization,
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problem- solving, and community involvement. Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines,
and Bucqueroux (1998) described the definition of community policing as a form
of police service based on a strategic alliance of citizens and police to solve
contemporary societal problems. These attributes were comprised of
components necessary for the potential advancement of information sharing
initiatives within the organizational parameters of community policing practices
(e.g., Bayley, 1988; Cordner, 1978; Goldstein, 1990; Greene & Mastrofski, 1988;
Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994; Skogan, 2004; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Skolnick &
Bayley,1986; Sparrow et al., 1990; Trojanowicz et al., 1998; Wilson, 2006).
Hickman and Reaves (2001) stated community policing gained
acceptance from police professionals as both an innovative and efficient way to
deliver police services. Beginning in 1984, over 150 agencies utilized a form of
community policing strategy. In 1994, 42% used some aspect of community
policing. In 2001, at the time of the 9/11 attack over 92% of police agencies used
a form of community policing in an effort to inform the public and maintain public
vigilance regarding domestic terrorist activities.
Gaffigan, Roth, and Buerger (2000) described the advantages of
community policing strategy as a potential strategic organizational structure for
information sharing initiatives. An additional benefit of the community policing
strategy was the merger of law enforcement interagency and community
cooperation to provide effective and efficient police services. The tenants of
community oriented and proscribed consultation with community groups
regarding local security needs and command reorganization. After consultation, a
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determination could be made regarding how best to respond to the situation.
Through collaborative process, law enforcement could increase connectivity with
the community for the purpose of the reduction of crime through problem-solving
tactics.
Wilson (2006) stated the natural relationship between the police and
community made the two entities natural crime fighting partners. The police relied
on the community to report crime and share information necessary to address
community concerns and solve societal problems. In turn, the community relied
on the police to assist in public emergencies and help curb disorder. Wilson
believed the community was more receptive to the development of proactive
practices because of the catastrophic nature of domestic terrorism. Since 9/11,
most communities accepted the challenge and responsibility of working with
police in this cause, but were reciprocally demanding more informational access
and transparent police organizations.
Skogan and Frydl (1999) stated innovations in information technology
allowed local police agencies to increase levels of communicative interactivity.
These innovations provided police the opportunity to access different types of
intelligence information more accurately and efficiently. Local police have been
able to increase the coverage of assigned patrol grids, with real-time
communication from agency response command centers, which increases
intelligence capacity. This example of proactive practice allowed police more
visibility and access within the community while simultaneously increasing patrol
efficiency. The advancements in the physical and technological capacity enabled
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law enforcement to make technological advancements in all types of electronic
recordkeeping (Kelling, 1994).
Skogan and Hartnett (1997) added community policing allowed police
agencies to decentralize services and reorganize patrol assignments to include a
wider breadth of services. The community policing approach offered increased
opportunities for sharing information and for increased police services to include
domestic terrorism prevention. Cordner, Gaines, and Kappeler (1996) stated the
goal of community policing was to change the process in which police services
were delivered, and directly attack the barriers associated with federated law
enforcement organizational structure. Community policing initiatives accelerated
the transition of police services to a proactive, participative style that encouraged
information sharing partnerships among all levels of law enforcement. The
community policing strategy would, in effect, deputize all members of the
community in the prevention of domestic terrorism, instead of the traditional
models of policing where police operated without the cooperation of the
community.
McPherson (2007) agreed community policing will be successful if
operational strategies that facilitate proactive policing can be utilized. McPherson
stated community policing has several philosophical applications to intelligence
information sharing, which can be constituted by transforming both the
organization as well as individual officers working in the organization. By taking
this approach, police services would be expanded to include domestic terrorism
prevention. Community policing also addressed problems not associated with
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traditional police tasks. Most importantly, community policing contributed to an
increase in the amount of information sharing partnerships above the local level.
Fridell (2004) stated in a study conducted by the Police Executive
Research Forum (PERF) that community policing increased the amount of
information sharing partnerships within the community and, additionally,
facilitated partnerships between all levels of law enforcement. Kelling and Coles
(1996) added the philosophy of community policing was an ideal complement to
the implementation information sharing because of its shared proactive nature
that enlisted the help of the community. Community policing programs originally
were implemented for the purpose of helping local police organizations distance
themselves from traditional, militaristic styles of police operation. The purpose
was to facilitate a new era of proactive police operations where the public viewed
local police departments as pro community and community friendly (Bayley,
1988; Chappell, 2009; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).
Skogan, Hartnett, Du Bois, Comey, and Lovig (1999) believed traditional
police activities combined with proactive policing techniques resulted in the
growth of community policing initiatives. For example, the creation of police
substations within local communities increased communication between the
public and police. However, local police learned citizen involvement was not
enough to ensure successful and consistent communicative interaction. Skogan
(1994) stated police have learned community involvement in all programs must
be constantly evaluated, and even with competent management, is difficult to
maintain:
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One of my conclusions drawn from the Chicago evaluation study is the
difficult in sustaining autonomous citizen action, even with the support of
local police. Organizations develop agendas that keep their energies
focused, even when key leaders tire or turn their attention to other
priorities. Local police agencies provide a focus for identification and
commitment to the program initiatives they choose to pursue. Local police
provide social benefits to participants which require constant attention. (p.
32)
McPherson (2007) stated one of the barriers of community and police
relations was the organization and delegation of duties between police and the
community. Organizational barriers remained, which made organizational
transformation to a proactive strategy difficult to integrate. Not every community
in the United States is willing to commit the resources necessary for additional
policing initiatives. Participating individual community members have reciprocally
demanded access to all types of police crime information. Community members,
in turn, demanded more openness from law enforcement, which previously
monopolized intelligence information.
Zhao, Thurman, and Reis (2008) suggested one of the unintended
barriers of the proactive community policing style as it relates to information
technology is it places more emphasis on communication within the agency and
less within the community. Community policing tactics can rectify this situation by
increasing contact with citizens. These contacts have contributed to an increase
in both quality and amount of accruable intelligence. Gaines, Kappeler, and
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Vaughn (1997) stated local police historically focused on the reduction of crime
and local police interest in information technology traditionally revolved around
this task. Information technology had assisted police with pursuing, monitoring,
and arresting suspects. Traditional police procedure dictates the police receive
information from interagency sources, and less from entities outside the agency.
Environmental Characteristics
Social Exchange Theory
Premkumar, Ramamurthy, and Nilakanta (1994) stated social exchange
theory has provided the foundation for the study of relationships between
organizations. Social exchange theory borrowed from several theory bases
including, but not limited to, transaction cost theory, political economy theory, and
power and politics organizational theories. The literature in this research area
specifically explored the concepts of power and trust.
Social exchange theory has been utilized to explain why organizations
choose to cooperate and participate with one another based upon non-economic
benefits. Son, Narashiman, and Riggins (1999) stated organizations’ collective
behavior will be determined by the responses to other organizations throughout
the business relationship cycle. Public agencies covet resources based upon a
dichotomy of power and dependence. Each agency covets resources that could
not be acquired without interagency cooperation.
Social exchange theory was originally developed by Homans (1950,
1974). Homans (1950, 1974) believed communication between two organizations
was most likely to occur when both sides acknowledge the benefits of
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exchanging resources. Homans (1974) stated an exchange of information is
eminent if both organizations mutually recognize the benefits of the relationship.
Social exchange theory was cited as one of the primary theories used by
researchers to explain why public agencies choose to participate in new
cooperative partnerships.
Social exchange theory analyzed strategic partnerships based on the
possession (also referred to as power) and dependency of organizational
resources. Aldrich (1976) defined power as a characteristic which offered
agencies the opportunity for greater access to informational resources. Unlike
power, dependency is perceived by the public sector as an undesirable
organizational quality, which could result in downsizing or elimination. Public
organizations that become dependent on other organizations for resources are
perceived as inferior and are vulnerable to consolidation or elimination. The
placement of these agencies within the overall organizational structure of the
government affects the agency’s ability to control scarce resources. In turn, the
flow of resources from organization to organization allows each to expand,
contract, dissolve, and reform as leaders deem necessary.
Benson (1975) defined relationships between organizations in terms of
political economy. The term political economy is defined as the dispersal of
scarce resources (information), which allows for a system of power relations
(networks) to develop between individual organizations, which allow for the
excursion of power (external influence) on one another. To that effect, a
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significant amount of literature has focused on the power—dependence
dichotomy of organizations.
The literature contains several seminal works involving organizational
administration theory, which described the strategic advantages public agencies
seek when engaged in cooperative initiatives with other organizations. Based on
an empirical study of 22 voluntary and governmental health-related agencies,
Levine and White (1961) defined exchange as a conceptual framework that
offered more latitude to the narrow definition developed by Homans (1972) in his
research involving small groups. Levine and White stated, “organizational
exchange is any voluntary activity between two organizations which has
consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals
or objectives” (p. 22). Although Levine and White defined exchange within the
context of long range time frames and with unequally empowered organizations,
the conclusion was that organizations aspired to maximize power within their
organization while limiting dependency on other organizations.
Levine and White (1961) cited the necessity for interorganizational
cooperation due to resource, labor, or client scarcity, and defined the degree of
interdependence between such organizations as a function of its access outside
the organizational structure. Levine and White framed the dimensions of
exchange in terms of the parties involved, kinds and quantities of entities traded
(i.e., resources, information), nature of the agreement underlying the
cooperation, and the consistency of organizational definitions.
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The second study is Litwak and Hylton’s (1962) treatment of the role of
coordinating agencies at the local level. Litwak and Hylton evaluated three
factors that comprised a matrix of the type of mechanisms designed to achieve
coordination between two or more agencies. The study relied on the assumption
that political conflict exists between agencies in the public sector because
organizations aspire to achieve a maximum level of autonomy. The three
variables tested were partial interdependence, awareness of interdependence,
and transactions capable of being defined in standardized units of action. Litwak
and Hylton focused on the study of interorganizational relations within the context
of unstructured authority, and later compared and contrasted unstructured
authority in terms of international relations between two governments.
Guetzkow’s (1962) study described three ways in which organizations
interact with one another. The interactions were identified as interpenetration of
partnerships, specialized roles of interaction across organizations, and
interactions through supraorganizational processes. The study was relevant to
criminal justice in that it involved the utilization of joint committees and task
forces. Roberts (2006) stated task forces traditionally have been the preferred
strategic method for sharing information across all levels of law enforcement.
Guetzkow identified both power and dependency relationships in which
coordination could be operationally accomplished through power and
dependency models. Guetzkow believed interaction between agencies could be
demonstrated through tacit coordination through consensus, domination by one
organization over another, and the establishment of new organizational entities
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through initiatives. Guetzkow agreed with Levine and White’s (1961) exchangebased model from the standpoint each organization assists the other toward
mutual goals in the course of service initiatives.
Bureaucracy of Individual and Organizational Social Interaction
A large section of bureaucratic literature involves the examination of the
individual worker’s interaction within the larger organizational structure. The
individual relationships are found in the social exchanges between individuals in
their own departments, relationships with other law enforcement agencies, as
well as the relationship of workers within their overall organizational environment.
Lipsky (1980) stated at its core the routines, simplifications, and environments of
street-level workers are inherently political (p. 84). Work product often is altered
by worker biases, which are determined by worker motivations of self-interest as
well as the interest of clients they are entrusted to serve. Street-level workers, in
effect, exchange the manner in which they perform their designated duties for
personal benefit and career benefit as well as for benefit of others of which they
are politically aligned.
Nonet and Selznick (2001) stated that bureaucratic organizations through
examination of their hierarchical organizational structure tend to promote the
institutionalization of individual work patterns found in a public bureaucracy.
Selznick introduced a relevant definition of an institution, which is applicable to
information sharing. Selznick’s research defined institutionalization as “the
emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely
organized, or narrowly technical activities” (Nonet & Selznick, 2001, p. 272).
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Selznick stated the stabilization of individual patterns as well as the individual
worker’s dedication to following the rules and regulation contained within the
proscribed work patterns will be contributing determinants to the outcome of any
given public policy.
Merton (1990) introduced the concept of the “bureaucratic personality,” in
which officials follow “ritualistic or extremely rigid behavior that detracts from
efficiency” (Merton, 1990, p. 141). The essential feature of this personality is “the
displacement of goals whereby an instrumental value (e.g., efficiency or
adherence to procedure) becomes a terminal value” (Merton, 1990, p. 141).
Downs (1967) offered a comprehensive review of the subject of
bureaucracy as it relates to innovation with his presentation of the laws of
increasing conservatism, imperfect control, counter control, and control
duplication (Goodsell, 1983; Nachmias & Rosenbloom, 1980; Nigro, 1970).
Levitan (2001) demonstrated how the institutional approach employed in
bureaucracies may ultimately affect decisions made by individual workers.
Goodsell (1983) agreed that an overly narrow emphasis on more narrow
objectives, such as procedure or efficiency, might engender a lack of concern for
broader agency goals.
Research by Warner (2007) and Kohn (1971) placed the correlation
between bureaucracy and bureaucrats and behavioral traits, such as
conservatism, goal displacement, and narrow-mindedness, into question. The
findings from studies conducted by Warner and Kohn appeared to contradict
Merton’s (1990) notion of the bureaucratic personality. The bureaucrat of Kohn’s
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type values self-direction, open-mindedness, and flexibility. Kohn suggested that
within the structure provided by a bureaucracy, administrators may find
themselves more free to peruse new initiatives than their counterparts in nonbureaucratic organizations (Goodsell, 1983; Wilson, 2006). Peters (2001) also
observed “tension . . . between the role of the bureaucracy as advocates of
innovation in policies and their role as conservers of procedures” (p. 225). The
dichotomy between these two objectives appears to gravitate back and forth as
public servants interacting with bureaucracies adapt and respond to external
pressures both from within their own organization politicians and constituents.
Lipsky (1980) offered several tenets applicable to understanding the
manner in which bureaucracy functions within public sector agencies of the
United States government. One of the similarities between street bureaucracy
and homeland security policy is that both seek the implementation of a strategic
framework (from an individual worker perspective), which operates from the
bottom to the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Lipsky explained how the
informal communication network between and among public agencies both
evolves and operates within public bureaucratic layers. Lipsky unequivocally
stated that power in American public bureaucracy continues to shift towards
street-level workers who, among other tasks, are increasingly working in
positions critical to public safety. Street-level workers, not group supervisors or
upper-level administrators, are directly responsible for successful individual
outcomes in all types of public agencies.
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Lipsky (1980) stated police officers, on a macro level, learn to navigate
between formal and informal policies set forth in their respective agencies, and
the interpretation of both formal and informal policies becomes part of police
culture. All aspects of job processes are analyzed, including the effect of streetlevel bureaucracy on communicative processes between and among agencies as
well as the efficiency of which their particular bureaucracy operates. One of the
integral ways individual public workers become powerful within a public
bureaucracy is by their ability to ration public service resources in the probable
event of scarcity. Information, particularly credible tips from informants, is
perhaps the most valuable investigative tool police officers possess. Street-level
police officers determine the flow of information up the chain of command by
choosing to withhold or release privileged information. This situation allows
street-level police the opportunity, if desired, to manipulate the system for
individual benefit.
For example, Lipsky (1980) pointed out the suppression of information
leads to lighter police officer caseloads and paperwork. Officers know that when
information is sent up the chain of command, they will be responsible for
providing follow-up investigations and reports. Therefore, street-level agents may
choose to put up roadblocks, such as offering a confusing litany of regulations
and guidelines as to how citizens can report terror information. This type of
conduct would theoretically reduce the number of credible citizen tips over a
period of time.
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Lipsky (1980) stated communicative efficiency, like all types of efficiency,
develops from an ongoing process that involves the simplification of routines.
Lipsky was specifically interested in the structuring of routines as well as the
copious examination of the contexts found within work routines. Lipsky believed
that the determination of routines by street-level public servants would lead to the
eventual formation of coherent and efficient public policy.
Lipsky (1980) also pointed out the evolvement of public policy is never
predetermined. In terms of measuring departmental efficiency, it may lead to
increased or decreased levels depending on the beliefs and biases of the
individual workers involved. The worker will act autonomously to the policies
already set forth by his or her employer and may choose a certain course of
action regardless of individual positive or negative views of information sharing.
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000) added to the work of Lipsky (1980)
by suggesting that although discretion is an interregnal component of the job of
the street-level worker, discretion can diverge into two distinct paths: as an agent
for the individual citizen or as an agent for the state. Maynard-Moody and
Musheno believe discretion, at its core, is the attempt of a public servant to
reconcile their responsibility as both a state and citizen agent. Both narratives are
not mutually exclusive, and experimentation continues until the public servant
settles through their work experiences and determines the preferable course of
action.
The individual narrative suggests public servants will base work decisions
on what they believe to be the value of the clients they serve. According to
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Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2000), this type of public service agent will
respond exclusively to individuals and circumstances. The service agents do not
describe themselves as public policy implementers or contributors. They do not
describe their decisions and actions based on the views of correctness of the
rules, wisdom of the policy, or accountability to any hierarchical authority or
democratic principal (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, p. 329).
Contrary to the citizen-agent, the state-agent narrative suggests public
servants will be influenced primarily by self-interest throughout the course of their
duties. The street agent will be guided by the path of least resistance as well as
the opportunity to make their work duties safer, easier, and more rewarding. The
street-level narrative suggests these workers are potentially informal policy
makers, yet many carry an honest concern over the impact their discretion has
on the system as a whole (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, p. 329).
External Influence: Incentives
External influence can take the form of encouragement or pressure and
can vary from recommendations, requests, or the imposition of penalties. In order
to create a climate for successful information sharing, a reward or punishment
system can be utilized. Markus and Keil (1994) believed if new government
systems are not reinforced by monetary incentives, the initiatives are likely to fail.
Similarly, Garfield (2000) agreed that without adequate financial support and
oversight, federal systems were less likely to succeed.
Bingham (1976) explained that intergovernmental grants, transfers, and
technical assistance contribute to the adoption of innovations by local
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governments that are critical to the process of information sharing. Bingham
agreed that government agencies providing the grants design them in a way that
the other agency seeking the grant should take action in the desired fashion.
Electronic information sharing requires the participation of several stakeholders,
and such sharing can promote conflicts of interest within the overall organization.
Chess (2001) explained organizational entities that enter into business
contracts with one another are habitually influenced by external forces. Likewise,
external influences are a critical variable to the successful implementation of any
information sharing program. The creation and development of information
sharing programs is strategically assessed as a necessary survival mechanism.
Chess (2001) and Chess, Salonlone, and Hence (1995) suggested that in order
for organizations to enhance information sharing efforts, an evaluation is needed
to assess both the process and the outcomes of potential initiatives. Researchers
cited intergovernmental influence as a significant factor in the adoption of
innovations by participating agencies (Chess, 2001; Leiss, 1996).
Trust
The research literature offers a variety of suggestions for overcoming the
organizational barrier of trust. As a result, some common themes emerge which
may overcome barriers and further assist in the development of information
sharing initiatives. Interagency trust has been a perennial barrier and has been
difficult to achieve and maintain in law enforcement because of political
pressures, the presence of territoriality, and frequent jurisdictional disputes. The
benefit of building trust in the public arena is viewed as a precursor for increased
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communication as well as the improvement of communication protocols. Trust
has gained importance for law enforcement agencies as new information sharing
initiatives are formed. It is considered by both academics and practitioners to be
a crucial first step for the delivery of public services (Leiss, 1996; Sjoberg, 2002).
Trust has been identified by scholars as a fundamental element for
developing communicative networks between agencies. Research has
suggested that trust is a precursor for communicative openness, facilitates
commitment between agencies, and encourages cooperation. From a purely
organizational standpoint, trust refers to the belief law enforcement agencies will
engage in actions that will result in partnerships which lead to positive outcomes
for all participating agencies. Peters, Covello, and McCallum (1997) identified
variables closely correlated to trust as openness, concern, and a desire to
increase knowledge.
Dawes (1996) stated trust is a fundamental precursor for sharing
information. This statement especially is applicable to intelligence information
available only through security clearance. The facilitation of trust provides
members of public agencies with an optimistic anticipation of the interaction, and
the belief information will be utilized for the benefit of all involved agencies.
Dawes believed the absence of trust inherently limits government initiatives and
increases bureaucratic red tape and administrative delay. Dawes stressed the
importance of explaining the benefits of sharing information to agency
supervisors prior to the attempted integration of new initiatives.
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Landsbergen and Wolken (2001) stated a lack of trust among public
agencies causes each agency to ultimately collect its own information, resulting
in increased bureaucracy and duplication. Danzinger (1979) stated an
information bias occurs for information acquired outside the scope of the
originating agency. The national research council stated trust between agencies
is directly correlated with the accuracy of information exchanged, legal standing
between the government agencies involved, and the amount of information that
needs to be verified with other government sources.
Organizational Culture Theory
Organizational culture theory is relevant to information sharing because an
investigation of police subculture reveals inherent barriers to communication.
Trice and Beyer (1993) stated all public and private organizations contain
cultures resistant to change. Organizational change theory involved the
examination of police subculture to determine which aspects of police subculture
act as barriers to the implementation of information sharing networks. New
initiatives can become future values to an organization if members of the
organization can be persuaded to support the proposed change.
Trice and Bayer (1993) also stated the transformation of an organizational
culture is universally problematic because dominant values in mature
organizations are slow to change. Organizations that seek meaningful change
must redefine their organizational culture, which includes written policies,
protocols, and procedures. This must be accompanied by individual member
change in the areas of values and belief systems. Organizational changes need
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to be introduced slowly through a combination of voluntary retirement, employee
turnover, and in-house training, which over time represents a generation of
workers within an organization.
Morgan (1998) explained culture is derived from the word “cultivation,”
which was attributed to “the process of tilling and developing land” (p. 112). The
process of cultivation is obtained from the identification of patterns associated
with different forms (Morgan, 1998). Morgan identifies the various forms as
values, knowledge, and protocol, which over time are considered routine
procedure. These routines are components of a larger social system found in
mature organizations, such as law enforcement agencies.
Scholars utilized organizational culture theory, in part, because by
examining the patterns of behavior passed down from groups of workers over a
period of time, a baseline of behavior develops. Behavior can be compared to the
proposed new ideas (communication of information through proactive police
service) so that it can be measured in an organization. Shein (1996) defined
organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that a group
learns as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration” (p.
34). These tenants operated efficiently enough to be considered valid, over time,
and therefore taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and
feel in relation to organizational work problems (Shein, 1996, pp. 373-374).
The protocol and knowledge passed generationally from one group of
workers to the next is passed through three tenants of organizational culture
theory defined as artifacts, values, and basic assumptions. Shein (1996) defined
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artifacts as “visible organizational structures and processes which are easy to
depict, but difficult to decipher” (p. 17). An example of an artifact in a police
organization is the side of a patrol car which reads, “to protect and to serve”
(Shein, 1996, p. 14). This example is a symbol of police power and the image of
police as the good guys. The artifact contains cultural significance for each
member as accepted pursuit and practice of police organizational goals. Manning
(1997) stated these images serve as a powerful force behind the establishment
of a culture of a police agency and of the image of individual members working
within the agency.
Rank and file officer values and belief systems comprise the backbone of
police organizations (Trojanowicz et al., 1998; Walker, 1993). The values and
assumptions developed by line officers through experience on the job is essential
to information sharing, but also a potential barrier to planned organizational
change. Line officers’ views and ultimately support of change is imperative
because rank and file officers are entrusted with the delivery of all new strategic
initiatives. Specifically, line officers are more likely to confront potential terrorists
than any other position in a police organization (Crank, 1998). However, patrol
officers are at the bottom of the power hierarchy in a traditional police
organizational chart, and police strategy does not originate from the bottom,
which tends to stifle innovation among members (Angell, 1976). New policing
practices need to be implemented, which allow inclusion of line officer
participation in a proactive organizational system.
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Line Officer Support
Chappell (2009) suggested administrators can alter police subculture, and
thus increase support of new programs through a combination of recruitment,
education, and training. However, the rate of change in any organization is
predicated based on positive worker perception of the changes before support
can be given. The changes must be of career benefit to every member of the
organization. The proscribed changes must involve new work activities that
support perceived officer strengths, so officers know their skills can contribute to
new procedures. Change needs to be executed in an expedient fashion so
workers can see the positive effects of changes as they are implemented.
Chappell stated the efficacy of change is an important consideration because of
historical police organizational resistance to police innovations of any meaningful
magnitude. The examination of police officer attitudes is important to proactive
police practices, such as community information sharing initiatives, because prior
research has indicated attitudes are strongly correlated to behavior (Engel &
Worden, 2003).
The transition from a traditional to a community paradigm within an
organization brings a new set of values and basic assumptions to the police job
description. New initiatives must be developed to guide officers through the
process of sharing information with other law enforcement agencies before
officers will support new processes. Line officers must be trained to contribute to
new initiatives with the investigative, analytical, and technical skills needed to
efficiently share information with federal law enforcement agencies. For example,
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leading a neighborhood meeting where intelligence information is gleaned,
networking with police officers in other agencies, or providing analytical analysis
of a terrorist threat and reporting the threat via computer, all are critical office
activities towards the implementation of information sharing initiatives. This type
of comprehensive change requires years of work in order to change the values
and belief systems of individuals who are used to performing daily activities using
fundamentally different police protocol (McPherson, 2007).
Sadd and Grinc (1994) described the recruitment of line officer support of
new initiatives as a battle for the hearts and minds of all involved. A significant
barrier exists to transform police employees selected, trained, and socialized to
perform one task, and then instruct police officers to perform in a manner which
fundamentally changes operation protocol. If information sharing initiatives are to
succeed, supervisors must persuade line officers to believe that information
sharing initiatives will benefit all levels of careers within the organization.
Supervisors must sell new innovations that will enhance willingness to pursue
goals associated within in a proactive manner consistent with implementing
information sharing practices.
Internal Pressure
Schermerhorn, Hunt, and Osborn (1994) stated a barrier to organizational
innovation is tension between line level employees and their supervisors. A
benefit of proactive police strategy is the improvement of relationships due to an
increased element of line level participation with supervisors in organizational
decision-making. Reuss-Ianni (1983) stated a proactive approach bridges
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potential divides within the two groups and increases overall organizational
communication. McDonnell (2002) agreed, “communication between two groups
in the same organization is a social affair involving the sharing of information.
The emphasis of proactive management relations is in the sharing aspect of
communication” (p. 406).
Crank (1998) stated many of the disagreements between line officer and
supervisors could be eliminated by increasing the levels of communication within
an agency. Blau (1963) stated a lack of aligned strategy as well as the traditional
division of labor and management within the organization ultimately contributes
to communication breakdown. Line officers often misinterpret the purpose behind
supervisor decisions, and supervisors believe certain officers may not be
following previously established police protocol.
The division between supervisors and line staff serve as a barrier to
communication problems. One of the causes of communication breakdown
inherent to the police subculture is secrecy. Westley (1953) stated secrecy is a
dangerous value embraced by police subculture. However, secrecy generally is
not considered by line officers to be a negative police subculture trait. Secrecy
has evolved as an honorable trait for a police officer within the organization.
Westley stated the police subculture equates secrecy or non-communication with
solidarity, loyalty, and trust. Secrecy and silence are the first rules impressed on
a new recruit. Thus, scholars focused on ethical over investigative considerations
that have negatively impacted local departments in the last century, such as
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corruption and use of force (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert 1998; Lersch, 2002;
Skolnick, 1994; Stevens, 1999; Weisburd & Greenspan, 2000).
Westley (1953) stated police are encouraged by members of their own
agency to keep investigations in house for both the benefit of the agency and for
self-preservation. If line police elect to circumvent the established chain of
command protocol, the action is considered disloyal. The irony is officers who
leak information are punished by an informal future restriction of information
regarding other investigations. The result is the individual officers’ access to
information within the department is severely restricted; hindering his or her
ability to make cases, and decreasing the possibility of promotion within the
department.
Manning (1997) stated the willingness to share information with
unapproved entities either inside or outside the agency conflicts with what Weber
described as “official secrets” (p. 227). Official secrets are defined as information
and knowledge that accumulate over time and grow with experience of service.
Police subculture dictates that information equates power, and police are
reluctant to relinquish, including other police officers or members of the public
(Weber, 1978).
Willis et al. (2004) observed in their case study involving officers in Lowell,
Massachusetts that a limited amount of information sharing between officers in
the same department was taking place, which is necessary to solve societal
problems such as terrorism. Willis et al. believed information sharing was limited
due to the expectation of supervisors, who possessed the most critical
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information within the agency, and had the duty of protecting the information that
would be closely guarded and not shared. This situation has prevented line
officers from sharing information in that the practice of sharing information up the
chain of command could be misconstrued by supervisors as criticism of job
performance. Therefore, in the prevailing survival of the fittest mentality, most
line officers do not speak at meetings, and follow what is generally referred in the
police subculture as taking the path of least resistance and risk.
Technological Barriers
Barriers to technological aspects of information sharing also must be
addressed in conjunction with new administrative and organizational initiatives
(Akbulut, 2003). Barriers to implementation include the determination of classified
and declassified documents in a rapidly expanding federal bureaucracy. All
documents must be assigned a security clearance prior to transfer to state and
local law enforcement agencies (Roberts, 2006). Second, the skill level and
support of information technology workers on both the federal and local levels
are critical to the expansion of information sharing initiatives (Garfield, 2000).
Also, the barriers involved with the complexity and logistics of implementation of
a comprehensive system must be addressed before information can occur
across all levels of law enforcement (Damanpour, 1991).
Roberts (2006) stated the new applications for technology in government
agencies has contributed to the dramatic increase in the volume of government
documents. Classified and de-classified documents must be organized efficiently
for information to flow from the federal to the local levels. The coordination of
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information is complicated by the diversity of terrorist related documents.
Department archivists responsible for the organization and transmission of such
documents are overwhelmed by the quantity of government documents available
for interagency transmission. Patterson and Sprehe (2002) reported even though
government leaders sought to reduce the amount of paperwork through
paperless office applications, such as databases, spreadsheets, and email, the
amount of data has increased to millions of unsorted, unclassified intelligence
documents over the past decade.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006) stated The Homeland
Security Department was created, in part, to implement the ambitious goal of
sharing information fluidly between the federal, state, and local levels of
government. Terrorism information is rendered useless if not shared in a timely
and efficient manner. An interoperable communications system must be
implemented to rapidly and accurately inform all relevant parties in the case of a
terrorist attack. A comprehensive incident command and operations plan—
detailing responsibilities and chains of command—also must be in place for
emergency use. Such a plan allows officials to determine the most appropriate
means of achieving interoperable communications (GAO, 2006). The proposed
communication system must be inherently functional, allowing for the efficient
access to information.
Technological advancements need to be introduced concurrently to any
organizational changes so intelligence information may flow freely through all
levels of law enforcement. To this end, the 9/11 Commission urged federal
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agencies to develop a decentralized network, which included state and local law
enforcement agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
recommended (and was subsequently endorsed by the 9/11 Commission)
information sharing processes and techniques as one of the four pillars leading to
improved national security. The 9/11 Commission (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks, 2004) recommended
a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland
security information . . . . Information will be shared horizontally across
each level of government and vertically among federal, state, and local
governments’ private industry and citizens. With the proper use of people,
organizational processes, and technology, homeland security officials
throughout the United States can possess complete and common
awareness of threats and vulnerabilities as well as the knowledge of the
personnel and resources available to address these threats. (para. 141)
Information Technology and Worker Attitudes
The collective talents displayed by government workers historically had
been a predictor of information sharing success. Tornatzky and Fleisher (1990)
as well as Perry and Danzinger (1999) observed the successful introduction of
new technologies is determined by the skill level of its operators. Organizations
that employ well-trained, experienced personnel tend to incur smaller training
and equipment costs in the integration of new technology. When police officers’
concerns of new initiatives are addressed directly, they are more likely to
participate in new initiatives (Swanton, 1981; Tait & Vessey, 1988). Initially,
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workers need to be convinced of the utility of new information systems. However,
continued exposure and reinforcement to new technology resulted in increased
user satisfaction and cultivated an environment conducive to further participation
in innovative projects.
Marchand (2004) stated positive worker attitudes have facilitated the
implementation of new information-sharing programs, particularly at the federal
level in regard to information technology. Marchand stated management must
stress the quality of interaction between users and information processing in the
organization. To the extent information systems are a means for achieving
organizational ends, information systems also must be responsive to the tasks of
government workers.
The presence of network representatives in both leadership and supportroles is important to success. Garfield (2000) and Norris (1989) demonstrated the
presence of a network representative is critical to the success and acceptance of
computer-linked systems. Garfield stated both user and technical experts must
be present within each organization. User experts guide the use and promotion
of the system, and technical experts make certain the systems operate
effectively.
Garfield (2000) introduced the term agency championship, referring to the
function of an internal sponsor of a technology initiative. Research suggested
individual sponsorship is important in the implementation of interagency
information sharing systems. Garfield demonstrated how a system-wide
champion is essential to attract interest and coordinate the implementation of an
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information sharing program. The existence of project champions was found to
be a significant element in the successful implementation of 83% of the
information systems studied by Runge (1985). However, the existence of a single
system-wide project champion is not always sufficient (Volkoff, Chan, & Newson,
1999). Garfield demonstrated the presence of a network of site champions was
important for the implementation success of networked computer systems.
The benefit of employing workers with prior experience and expertise
concerning technological initiatives is a significant factor that affects a public
agency's ability to establish new organizational and technological systems.
Organizations that have past innovation experience tend to be more inventive in
other areas (Damanpour, 1991). Norris (1989) and Newcomer and Caudle (1991)
found that previous agency information technology experience is a significant
factor both in the adoption of new systems and the development of a positive
organizational climate.
Information technology literature has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of meticulous management to coordinate information sharing and
homeland defense (Posner, 2003). For example, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office [GAO] (GAO, 2003) cautioned the “introduction of newer,
faster, cheaper technology is not a panacea for flawed management practices or
poorly designed business processes” (p. 3). The Accounting and Information
Management Division of the United States Government and Defense Information
Systems observed the underlying problem with government information sharing
is poor management (GAO, 2003).
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Research by Public Technology (2000) reported effective information
security is not related exclusively to technology, but instead requires strategic
acumen on the part of management. Research by Berman and West (2002)
concluded information technology workers need to combine technical expertise
with management savvy to successfully work with other agencies in order to
achieve strategic objectives. Moreover, the Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002) determined a welldesigned information security system “requires expertise in information
management and security technologies, as well as an understanding of policy
requirements, business models, and organizational processes” (p. 2).
The use of information technology speeds information flow and facilitates
positive management values within an organization. However, the extent which
information technology reinforces organizational values often depends on its
implementation into the organization. Owen (1989) stated, “the creation of
management values is useful for the reduction of administrative delay through
information technology is to a larger extent a human and organizational problem
and to a lesser extent a technological problem” (p. 2). In addition, middle and
upper-managers should be accountable for their respective agencies regarding
information security practices. Information technology managers must possess a
unique understanding of information-related risk in order to make prudent
decisions.
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Organizational Complexity
Organizational complexity seeks to capture the overall scope of an
agency’s operations, specifically in the areas of specialization, functional
differentiation, and attitudes of the implementing workforce (Damanpour, 1991).
Complexity is an important consideration in any proposed information sharing
initiative, because complexity is one of the most prevalent barriers to the
implementation of information sharing. Rogers (1995) defined complexity as the
degree to which an initiative is difficult to understand and implement. Social
scientists searched for accurate units of measurement that will be able to analyze
the degree of complexity involved, because the degree of complexity correlates
positively to the rate of successful adoption of initiatives.
Social scientists often analyze proposed information sharing initiatives
from the perspective of a complexity-simplicity continuum. This continuum allows
each initiative to be analyzed using a common system of measurement.
According to Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973), information sharing initiatives
inherently involve a series of complex ideas. The intrinsic nature of electronic
information sharing also involves a higher level of complexity in terms of logistics
and the ability to implement an initiative, such as information sharing, across the
entire organizational structure contained in both federal and local law
enforcement.
Complexity as it relates to the topic of information sharing also can be
analyzed from an individual perspective. Rogers (1995) stated the complexity of
an initiative or innovation, as it is perceived by members of an organization, is
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negatively related to its rate of adoption. When a communication network is
complex to the point of non-comprehension, a natural human tendency exists to
reject the initiative and withdraw from participation.
The proposed communication system must be usable, thereby enabling
efficient, easy access to information. Taylor (1986) pointed out that usability of a
system is related to the interface between the system and its human user.
Factors such as design, standardization, and coordination between information
systems, as well as the location of computing resources, are significant factors
that determine the efficiency and usability of information systems. It follows that
user-friendly systems are accessed more frequently and with greater success.
Watson, Houdeshel, and Rainer (1997) explained why traditional
information systems have had a limited impact on the upper management:
despite claims of usability, they are too complex to be used by a majority of
government agencies. User-friendliness rather than purely technical optimization
ultimately is a critical element of an information technology system.
One method for organizational planners to assess complexity is to analyze
the complexity of networks operating within the confines of the overall network
structure. This process can be accomplished by analyzing the extent to which a
network is considered to be structured or unstructured. Communication structure
helps analyze the speed and stability of a network, which are both important
indicators of the complexity of the network. From an organizational standpoint,
network innovations, which contain relatively simplistic ideas typically, are given
more consideration by planners than complicated ideas.
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Choi (1993) stated network structures can be measured to the extent that
human decisions needed to run the systems are repetitive. Because the tasks
involved in computer network systems are repetitive, the organization has
previously developed a specific organizational process for handling problems.
Conversely, when a request involves an unstructured action, it involves a
decision that has not been previously handled, and thus likely to consume more
time and resources to remedy the situation. Unstructured information results in
an inefficient response, and is referred to by computer network experts as
administrative delay.
Choi (1993) stated the scale of novelty of an organization also has a direct
correlation to complexity. Typically, government organizations that share
intelligence information as one of its missions fall on the large-scale end of the
continuum. When the scale of novelty is large, an increased level of commitment,
resources, and manpower is required. It also allows for larger systems than
would be created in the private sector, with a greater percentage of unstructured
network systems. As Kaufman (1977) pointed out, characteristics that would be
considered unacceptable and dangerous to organizations in the private sector
often are tolerated in the public sector, due to government agencies’ unwavering
commitment to equity, transparency, and oversight. Inefficient practices such as
duplication and multiplicity in complex processes involved in the public sector
often are justified in government organizations that lack a competitive economic
environment.
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The management of information systems and, specifically, the
management of data streams are a critical component of information sharing.
Intelligence data shared between agencies often arrives in an unstructured
fashion. Unstructured data is by definition non-compatible with the current
agency structure, and thus takes additional resources and manpower to conduct
information searches. Roberts (2006) referred to unstructured data as “the
beating heart of any government agency, the center of everything the agency
seeks to accomplish” (p. 212).
Structured data provides a framework of which intelligence information
can be processed programmatically. Downs (1967) warned that computer
systems typically respond only to standard protocol previously programmed
according to old standards. Lost and misreported information is inevitable under
this type of system. Myers (1967) and Reif (1968) warned structured data codes
contain a predetermined amount and type of information, and must be managed
properly even if the information is converted from structured codes.
Many of the factors of compatibility and complexity contain a combination
of network and organizational attributes. For example, a network innovation
compatible with one organization might be completely incompatible with another.
Similarly, supervisors in a governmental organization may favor one innovation
over another and aspire to increase budgetary resources for their favored
initiative at the expense of other initiatives. Therefore, compatibility is best
viewed as a combination of information technology networks and organizations
merging to establish new processes. Wise (2002) emphasized, “the search for
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compatibility in implementation of an idea is impossible in the absence of
agreement on priorities and goals” (p. 5). Therefore, the coordination of goals
both between and among agencies is essential in order to achieve
interoperability across all levels of law enforcement.
Research Question and Hypotheses
This study is designed to address the following research question: What
factors influence intelligence information sharing between local and other law
enforcement agencies? The following hypotheses were tested:
H1:

There is a significant linear relationship between the gender of a
police officer and support for information sharing.

H2:

There is a significant relationship between race and police officer
support of information sharing.

H3:

There is a significant linear relationship between the educational
level of police officers and support for information sharing.

H4:

There is a significant linear relationship between the experience of
police officers and support for information sharing.

H5:

There is a significant linear relationship between prior military
service of police officers and support for information sharing.

H6:

There is a significant linear relationship between the type of training
police officers receive and support for information sharing.

H7:

There is a significant relationship between the size of a police
department and support for information sharing.
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H8:

There is a significant linear relationship between support for
community policing and support for information sharing.

H9:

There is a significant linear relationship between the complexity of
communication tasks and support for information sharing.

H10: There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of
external influence and support for information sharing.
H11: There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of
internal influence and support for information sharing.
H12: There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of
trust between federal and local police agencies and support for
information sharing.
Summary
Chapter II presented a review of the literature related to the research
questions of the study. The intent of the presented information was to ground the
study upon current research on the topics and to lend support for an investigation
into what correlations exists among the variables of the study. To fully explain the
complexity of accurately and efficiently sharing intelligence information between
all levels of law enforcement, the literature review included a detailed description
of the police organizational movement from reactive to proactive police
strategies. Other topics reviewed included organizational bureaucracy,
community policing, and a description of information sharing strategies post 9/11
between federal and local agencies. Chapter III provides a detailed description of
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the methodology to be employed to gather and analyze data in sufficient detail to
suggest recommendations to answer the research questions.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Chapter III presented the research methodology. This chapter described in
detail the methods which were employed in the study. The methodology section
included the sample, instrument development and testing, data collection, and
analysis.
Research Method and Design Appropriateness
The research design of this study was an elaboration logically derived
from the Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study sections from
Chapter I (Simon & Francis, 2006). A need to describe and measure the degree
of relationship between two or more variables resulted in the selection of a
quantitative design (Creswell, 2005). A quantitative research method, specifically,
correlation analysis, provided the group of statistical measures considered
necessary to portray the relationships between the dependent and independent
variables (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).
Quantitative Research
The goal of quantitative research is to collect numerical data and construct
statistical models in an attempt to explain observations (Creswell, 2005).
Researchers use questionnaires, in part, to collect data, which is efficient in
testing hypotheses (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Quantitative research is objective,
and the research field describes it as countable. Quantitative research involves
asking specific, narrow questions to obtain measurable variables (Creswell,
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2005). The use of a survey instrument to collect data from preset questions lends
itself well to a quantitative method of measuring the variables (Neuman, 2006).
Quantitative research differs from qualitative, as quantitative seeks to
systematically, factually, and accurately describe the facts and characteristics of
a given population or area of interest (Neuman, 2006). Quantitative research
uses detailed questions to obtain measurable and observable numerical data on
variables (Creswell, 2005). Qualitative data collection is subjective because the
data collected is in words, pictures, or objects (Neuman, 2006).
The selection of a quantitative design is appropriate when variables of the
study are clear (Creswell, 2005). When variables are unknown, a qualitative
design may help identify what is important, determining, in part, what needs to be
studied (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Qualitative research studies typically help
describe, interpret, and validate certain assumptions or generalizations (Neuman,
2006). Because the variables for this study are clear, a quantitative design
examined the relationship between the variables in order to address the research
questions.
Quantitative research uses a language of variables and relationships
among variables to investigate research questions. A variable, as opposed to a
constant, can fluctuate or be expressed as more than one value (Simon &
Francis, 2006). Quantitative designs have at least two types of variables:
independent and dependent (Creswell, 2005).
Understanding variables is essential in analyzing the data collected.
Distinguishing between dependent variables and independent variables is
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imperative (Creswell, 2005). An independent variable stands alone and is not
changed by the other variables measured. Dependent variables are contingent
on other factors.
Quantitative descriptive research methodologies include correlations,
observations, and surveys. Additional quantitative approaches include
experimental and causal-comparative methodologies (Neuman, 2006). Each of
these approaches yielded information which was summarized by statistical
analysis.
Participants
Participants were selected from a total of 2,100 law enforcement
personnel from police ranks in four geographical areas of the United States. The
appropriate number of participants was determined by pairing the combined
population size of the four police departments surveyed with the desired 95%
confidence level selected by this researcher. Dillman (2007) determined the
appropriate number of participants is a minimum of 322 survey respondents. (p.
207). The cities were selected as a convenient sample by this researcher and
were divided into regions of the United States, with each region represented by
one police department in four separate states. Two small police departments
(less than 50 officers) as well as two large police departments (more than 200
officers) were selected so large and small department comparisons could be
made. Federal law enforcement personnel were exempt from this study because
the purpose of this study was to examine the level of support and participation of
local personnel in information sharing initiatives from the local to the federal level.

78
The street- or line-level police officer is the type of officer most likely to encounter
a domestic terrorist. Street-level officers also have the opportunity to take part in
the administrative process by directly typing into their laptops the terrorism
information to be shared with state and local law enforcement, thus patrol or line
officers were preferred in this study.
In addition, police departments located in cities on or near a geographical
border were preferred. Sarewitz, Pielke, and Keykhah (2003) stated even with
the application of advanced statistical modeling, it is impossible to predict where
a future catastrophic event will occur. However, extreme events often are
predicated by context. The fact the 9/11 attack occurred in the largest United
States metropolitan area demonstrated the potential vulnerability of large
metropolitan coastal cities. Also, police departments were preferred that had
experience with other types of first responder crises, such as hurricanes,
tornados, or floods. Finally, police departments with prior information sharing
experiences with federal and state agencies were desired in other areas of law
enforcement such as drugs, fugitives, guns, and gangs. The following is a
breakdown of respondent demographics.
Table 1
Respondent Demographics—Region

Region

Total

Percent

North

246

60.3

West

132

32.4
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Table 1 (continued).

Region

Total

Percent

South

24

5.9

East

6

1.5

Total

408

100

Table 2
Respondent Demographics—Gender

Gender

Male

Female

North

230

16

West

114

18

South

23

1

East

6

0

Total

373

35

Table 3
Respondent Demographics—Ethnicity

Ethnicity
North

White

Black

Hispanic

Other

205

37

0

4
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Table 3 (continued).

Ethnicity

White

Black

Hispanic

Other

West

124

4

0

4

South

23

1

0

0

East

6

0

0

0

Total

358

42

0

8

Table 4
Respondent Demographics—Age

Age

20–30

31–40

41–50

51–60

61+

North

82

72

48

34

10

West

2

10

11

2

0

South

3

9

9

1

2

East

0

3

1

1

1

Total

115

132

106

41

13
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Table 5
Respondent Demographics—Education

Education

High school

Bachelors

Masters

Doctorate

Other

North

55

142

15

1

0

West

12

93

4

0

22

South

12

6

0

0

6

East

1

3

1

0

1

Total

80

244

20

1

62

Table 6
Respondent Demographics—Experience

Experience

0–5

6–10

11–15

16–20

21–25

26+

North

83

42

43

30

21

27

West

22

32

43

27

6

1

South

4

6

5

5

2

2

East

0

1

1

1

1

2

Total

109

81

92

63

30

32

Note. Experience is listed in years
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Table 7
Respondent Demographics—Military

Military

Yes

No

North

60

186

West

37

192

South

8

16

East

1

5

Total

106

302

Table 8
Respondent Demographics—Training

Training

Trad

Com Pol

North

246

0

West

0

132

South

24

0

East

6

0

Total

276

132
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Table 9
Respondent Demographics—Rank

Rank

Patrol

Corp

Sarg

Other

North

156

7

32

51

West

101

0

13

18

South

10

3

2

9

East

5

0

0

1

Total

269

11

49
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Table 10
Respondent Demographics—Department Size

Department size

Large

Small

North-L

246

0

West-L

132

0

South-S

0

24

East-S

0

6

378

30

Total

Of those participants who completed the items which requested
demographic information, 246 (60%) were identified from the North Region. The
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West Region contained 132 (32%) percent of respondents surveyed. The South
Region reported 24 (6%) of the total number of respondents surveyed. The East
Region reported 13 (2%) of the total number of respondents surveyed.
Of those participants who completed the items which requested gender
information, 373 (91%) were identified as male police officers, while 35 (9%)
were identified as female police officers. Further, 358 (88%) respondents were
identified as White or Caucasian. In addition, 42 (10%) respondents identified
themselves as Black, and eight (2%) respondents identified themselves as other.
Of those participants who completed the items which requested education
information, 80 (20%) respondents had earned a high school diploma, 244 (61%)
respondents earned a college diploma, 20 (5%) respondents held a master’s
degree, and one (0.03%) respondent held a Ph.D. In addition, 62 (15%)
respondents indicated their degree as other. The other as a category was
identified by this researcher as police officers who have obtained an associate’s
degree.
Of those participants who completed the items which requested
information on age, 115 (28%) respondents were between the ages of 20–30.
Further, 132 (32%) respondents were between the ages of 31–40. In addition,
104 (26%) respondents were between the ages of 41–50. Further, 41 (10%)
respondents indicated they were between the ages of 51–60. Finally, 13 (0.03%)
respondents were over the age of 61.
Of those participants who completed the items that requested information
concerning police work experience, 109 (27%) respondents indicated they had
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0–5 years on the job experience, and 81 (20%) respondents indicated they had
between 5–10 years of police work experience. Further, 92 (27%) participants
indicated they had between 10–15 years of on the job experience. In addition, 63
(27%) participants indicated they had between 16–20 years of on the job
experience. Further, 30 (7%) participants indicated they had between 21–25
years of on the job experience. Finally, 32 (8%) participants indicated they had
over 26 years of experience as a police officer.
Of those participants who completed the items that requested information
concerning their rank as a police officer, 269 (66%) respondents indicated they
currently hold the rank of a patrol officer. In addition, 11 (2%) respondents
indicated they currently hold the rank of corporal. Further, 49 (12%) participants
indicated they currently hold the rank of Sergeant. Finally, 79 (19%) participants
listed their rank as other. Other includes all other ranks not specifically
referenced in the study, including ranks up to chief of police.
Of those participants who completed the items which requested
information concerning whether they were a member of the military, 106 (26%)
respondents stated that they served in the military, while, 302 (74%) respondents
stated they have never served in the military
Of those participants who completed the items that requested information
concerning whether respondents were trained using the traditional or community
philosophy, 276 (68%) stated they were trained using traditional methods, while
132 (32%) respondents stated that they have been trained in some aspect of
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community policing. Finally, 343 (91%) respondents were from large police
departments, while 31 (9%) stated they were members of small departments.
Instrumentation
Quantitative data collection and data analysis required careful
consideration of the survey instrument design. The primary goal was to ensure
the survey, and the data collected with the survey, provide the intended
measurement (Creswell, 2005). Meaningful conclusions were achieved through
the survey and data collection process. An anonymous three-part survey which
consisted of a series of questions pertaining to respondent demographics,
information sharing survey, and an open-ended question comprise the survey
instrument.
The demographic instrument collected the data necessary to provide a
number of descriptive statistics pertaining to the respondents’ project
management experience, the scope and complexity of the project, and the
project collaboration tools used to complete the project. Researchers use
descriptive statistics to describe raw data. Descriptive statistics include measures
of central tendency, such as the mean, median, and mode (Leedy & Ormrod,
2005).
The survey instrument provided a measurement of line officers’ support of
information sharing initiatives as well as views of police service delivery. One
open-ended question was also included, and some survey respondents provided
written opinions of barriers to information sharing implementation, which may or
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may not have been different from barriers presented within the context of the
survey instrument.
The survey was validated through consultation with experts in the fields of
survey research, business administration, and law enforcement. Dr. Robert
Adkins, Dean Emeritus, Liberty University; and Dr. Pedro Pellet, Professor of
Business Administration, Nova Southeastern University, reviewed the survey to
ensure the survey structure was constructed properly, with appropriate and
understandable language to facilitate accurate responses.
In addition, law enforcement personnel were consulted by this researcher
to ensure the questions reflect the current and future factors related to federal
and local law enforcement information sharing partnerships. An effort was made
by this researcher to structure the questions for the respondents in a manner that
would facilitate maximum understanding and participation. The solicited law
enforcement personnel included Dr. William Campbell, United States Customs
Officer, Retired; Mr. Terry Milam, Chief, St. John Police Department, St. Louis
County, Missouri; and Mr. John Burke, St. Louis City Police Officer, Retired.
After consultation with the panel, the following adjustments were made to
the survey instrument. First, the panel recommended the survey be shortened to
minimize the time needed to complete the survey. The panel also cited the large
amount of paperwork as not to distract the officers as they perform their duties.
As a result of this request, the survey was shortened so that it would take no
longer than 10–15 minutes to complete.
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Second, the panel stated some of the questions in the survey
questionnaire may be difficult for police officers to understand. Therefore, a
readability test was utilized by this researcher. Readability metrics were intended
to identify the difficulty police officers might experience in understanding a
question in a survey. Pretlow (2008) stated readability tests were first developed
in the United States in the 1920s based on mathematical formulas designed to
determine the suitability of course-specific textbooks for American students.
Flesch (1948) originally calibrated the formulas based on the students’
appropriate grade levels as well as age. The equation provided a readability
score based on the number of words per sentence as well as the number of
syllables per word.
Table 11
Information Sharing Survey Meta-Analysis

Question
#

Survey question

FleshKincade
grade level

FleshKincade
read
score

Words per
sentence

Characters
per word

General Questions / Community Policing
1)
2)
3)

4)

Information obtained from
citizens is critical to good
police work.
Cooperation with other
agencies is critical to good
police work.
I sometimes need access to
information during the
course of an investigation
that I know other law
enforcement agencies
possess.
I believe that preventing
crime is just as important as
solving crimes.

10.7

35.9

10

5.7

10.7

35.9

10

6.1

12

24.7

20

5.4

6.7

67.7

12

4.9
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Table 11 (continued).

Question
#
5)

Survey question
I believe solving problems in
the community is an
important part of police work.

FleshKincade
grade level

FleshKincade
read
score

Words per
sentence

Characters
per word

9.1

56.2

15

4.6

Support
1)

The attack of 9/11 has
increased the need for better
communication between all
levels of law enforcement.

11.5

42.8

18

4.7

2)

If I were appointed the chief
administrator of my agency, I
would make information
sharing a priority.

12

30.3

17

5.1

3)

If I were appointed the chief
administrator of my agency, I
would be willing to allocate
agency resources for
information sharing.

12

28.4

21

5.1

4)

I believe the overall benefits
of sharing information with
other agencies outweighs
the negatives.

12

77.3

14

5.9

5)

If I were appointed the chief
administrator of my agency, I
would support information
training with other law
enforcement agencies.

12

21.5

20

5.5

External Influence
1)

2)

3)

Federal agencies have had
an influence on our
department's decision to
share information with other
agencies.
Federal agencies have
suggested that our agency
share intelligence
information electronically.

12

26.6

16

5.8

12

27.7

11

5.8

Our agency has previously
accepted an invitation from a
federal agency to participate
in a joint training task force
involving counterterrorism.

12

42.9

21

5.8
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Table 11 (continued).

Question
#

Survey question

FleshKincade
grade level

FleshKincade
read
score

Words per
sentence

Characters
per word

4)

Our agency has been
criticized by other law
enforcement agencies for
our handling of information
during a joint investigation.

12

24.4

13

5.7

5)

Federal agencies keep our
agency informed about the
downside of not sharing
information.

10.7

35.9

10

6.1

Complexity
1)

It is difficult to learn
computer skills necessary
for sharing information with
other law enforcement
agencies.

12

16.1

16

5.9

2)

Electronic information
sharing is a difficult concept
to understand.

12

37.3

9

6.5

3)

I am willing to spend a large
amount of time to learn a
computer system format
which has the potential to
provide useful information.

12

51.1

24

4.6

4)

I have received periodic
training associated with
information sharing from
other agencies.

12

48.5

12

4.5

5)

It is more difficult to share
information with other law
enforcement agencies which
do not have the same
standard operating
procedures as our agency.

12

27.3

24

5.4

37.9

12

5.3

Trust
1)

Federal agencies and our
agency have a high level of
mutual trust.

10.2
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Table 11 (continued).

Question
#

Survey question

FleshKincade
grade level

FleshKincade
read score

Words per
sentence

Characte
rs per
word

2)

Federal agencies keep our
departments' best interest in
mind.

12

37.9

9

5.7

3)

If our agency shared
intelligence information with
a federal agency, I am
confident that the information
shared would not be
compromised.

12

21.5

20

5.7

4)

Pertinent information and
investigative assistance by
outside agencies are
encouraged by my agency.

12

30.2

13

5.3

5)

I would feel comfortable
going outside my agency's
chain of command if I
believed I had information
that was being ignored by my
agency.

12

30.2

13

5.3

Internal Pressure
1)

I would be more likely to
support information sharing if
my supervisor though it was
important.

10.5

47.8

16

5

2)

I would be more likely to
support information sharing if
I were given greater flexibility
by my supervisor to conduct
and share information as the
investigation dictates.

12

21

27

5.5

3)

I believe that learning and
applying information sharing
techniques is important for
my career advancement.

12

28.2

15

6.1

4)

The time my supervisors
make me spend on tasks
associated with information
sharing could be better spent
in other areas of law
enforcement.

12

40

23

5.1
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Table 11 (continued).

Question
#
5)

Survey question
My agency administrators
make information sharing a
priority in my department.

Totals

FleshKincade
grade level

FleshKincade
read
score

Words per
sentence

12

42.2

11

6.1

12

32.3

17.3

5.2

Characters
per word

Procedures
The names and mailing addresses for department supervisors were
obtained from the Chief of Police for all geographic areas. The survey was
mailed to department supervisors, who were responsible for distributing the
survey to individual participants.
A two-stage mailing procedure was used that included overnight mailings
through the U.S. Postal Service. Surveys were sent with a cover letter explaining
the study, and a self-addressed, stamped overnight envelope was included.
Although surveys were completed anonymously to protect the identity of
individual participants, a tracking system was used so that non-responders could
be identified. After four weeks, the same surveys, cover letter, and selfaddressed, stamped return envelope were sent to region representatives asking
the potential respondents to complete the survey and return if they had not
already done so. The second cover letter asked respondents to disregard the
reminder letter if they already have completed and returned the survey within the
first mailing period. Although the two-stage mailing process represents the
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primary manner in which the study was conducted, other factors were present
which need be added to the procedures described in the study. These factors
included both the location and size of the police departments selected for the
study. Both the location and size of the departments made it feasible in some
instances for this researcher to follow-up in person in order to try and maximize
the response rate.
Chain of Custody of Survey Instrument
The chain of custody in this study was from this researcher to previously
selected police department representatives. The representatives were
designated by the police chiefs to deliver the survey instrument to the
respondents, typically at a patrol meeting or during work breaks. The surveys
were returned upon completion to the representative who forwarded them to this
researcher via overnight mail or, in some instances, by a face-to-face meeting
with this researcher.
Survey Responses and Sample Population
Descriptive characteristics of respondents were presented in Tables 1–10.
Surveys were distributed to 500 potential respondents in each of the large police
departments and 25 surveys for the small police departments. The overall survey
response rate for the study was 39%. The survey response percentages broken
down by region and size of department were as follows: for the north region, of
the 500 surveys distributed, 246 surveys were returned, for a percentage of 49%;
for the west region, of the 500 surveys distributed, 132 were returned, for a
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percentage of 26%. The overall percentage of surveys returned for large police
departments was 36%.
The survey response percentage for small police departments were as
follows: the South region had 24 surveys distributed, and 24 surveys were
returned, for a percentage of 100%; the East Region had 13 surveys distributed,
and 6 surveys were returned, for a percentage of 46%; and the overall
percentage of surveys returned from small police departments was 94%.
Social scientists historically have disagreed on acceptable rates of return.
For example, Fitzgerald and Cox (1987) stated a 50% survey return rate is
considered average, but needed for valid results. Babbie (1989) suggested a
70% survey return rate can be achieved through application of enhanced survey
techniques, but might not necessarily be needed depending on the accessibility
to the target population. Babbie added future trends in research indicate a shift
towards a lower acceptability of survey returns.
Colwell, Miller, Lyons, and Miller (2006) added response rates vary due to
disparities in resources, time, and effort of the researcher, as well as differences
in subject matter and the target population to be studied. Winfree, Guiterman,
and Mays (1997) stated that, historically, police officer based studies have
yielded relatively low response rates ranging from 30–50%. McKee (personal
communication, December 20, 2008) speculated that increased paperwork and
case load of police officers due to budget constraints have contributed to the
comparatively low rate of survey return. McKee added as the field of criminal
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justice increases in scope, competition for research access to key police
departments also will increase.
Informed Consent
An informed consent form for each study participant was included with
each questionnaire distributed. The informed consent form advised perspective
participants that participation in the study was voluntary, and return of the
questionnaire was considered for purposes of the study as consent to participate.
Respondents were notified that all responses remained confidential throughout
the entire research process, including the reporting of results. There was no risk
to respondents that participated in the study, and no questions were asked which
were related to specific or ongoing police investigations.
Confidentiality
Questionnaires were mailed directly to the designated department
representatives whose police departments agreed to take part in the study. The
questionnaires contained no specific respondent identification data of any type.
Respondent representatives returned the anonymous questionnaire in an
overnight package, which was used strictly for coding and analysis purposes by
this researcher.
Data Analysis
Survey data was entered into a computer using the SPSS for Windows
statistical package 18.0. Descriptive statistics (frequencies, range of scores,
means, and standard deviations) were utilized to describe the respondents in
terms of their demographic and background characteristics. T-tests were used to
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analyze the differences in responses between groups based on demographic
variables (e.g., sex, race/ethnicity, geographic location, level of education).
Multiple regression analysis was used on the question portion of the survey
instrument in order to determine which independent variables might be used to
predict support for intelligence information sharing initiatives (e.g., trust, internal
influence, external influence, complexity, and community policing).
Summary
Chapter III provided a detailed description of the methodology to be
employed to gather and analyze data in sufficient detail to suggest
recommendations to answer the research questions (Neuman, 2006). Chapter III
also provided a rationale for the appropriateness of a quantitative approach using
a multiple regression analysis (Creswell, 2005; Leedy & Ormand, 2005). A
description of the target population, geographic location, and sampling frame
provided some insight into the demographics of study participants. A review of
the data collection and analysis process included details of survey instruments,
obtaining informed consent, maintaining confidentiality, and ensuring validity and
reliability in the study.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF DATA
Instrument Evaluation
The structure of the Information Sharing Survey was examined using
exploratory factor analytic techniques. It was predicted that five major factors
would emerge: Trust, Internal Influence, Community Policing, External Influence,
and Complexity. Questions that were loaded heavily on more than one factor as
well as questions that failed to load heavily on any factor were considered invalid
and eliminated from further analysis. The resulting scale was determined to be
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = .664). Table 1 presents the rotated component
matrix of the questions that were retained and thus used in the subsequent
regression analyses.
Table 12
Equamax Rotated Component Matrix, N = 408

Item

Factor I

Trust #1

.660

Trust #2

.785

Trust #3

.781

Trust #4

.679

Factor II

Internal Influence #1

.735

Internal Influence #2

.659

Internal Influence #4

.414

Internal Influence #5

.670

Factor III

Factor IV

Factor V
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Table 12 (continued).

Item

Factor I

Factor II

Factor III

Community Policing #1

.610

Community Policing #2

.464

Community Policing #4

.648

Community Policing #5

.711

Factor IV

External Influence #1

.331

External Influence #3

.696

External Influence #5

.694

Factor V

Complexity #3

.691

Complexity #4

.687

Complexity #5

.383

Note. Loadings less than .35 are not displayed to facilitate factor identification.

As illustrated in Table 12, Question 5 on the trust subscale was
eliminated, as was Question 3 from the Internal Influence subscale, Question 3
from the community policing subscale, Questions 2 and 4 from the external
influence subscale, and Questions 1 and 2 from the complexity subscale.
Table 13 presents zero-order correlation coefficients for select
demographic variables and support for information sharing. The variables,
gender, education level, military service, and training type, were not significantly
correlated with support for information sharing. Years of experience was,
however, significantly correlated to support for information sharing. This suggests
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that, on average, younger, less experienced officers are less likely to support
information sharing than are older, more experienced officers.
Table 13
Zero-Order Intercorrelation Matrix for Demographic Variables and Support for
Information Sharing (N = 408)

Variable
Gender

Gender

Education

Experience

—

-.021

-.159**

—

Education
Experience

Military

Training

Support

.022

.067

-.079

.107*

-.089

.071

-.010

—

-.046

-.028

—

-.032

-.022

—

.067

.215**

(years)
Military
Training
Support

—

Note. Coding: Sex (0 = Female, 1 = Male); Education (0 = High School, 1 = B.A. / B.S., 2 = Master’s, 3 = Doctorate);
Experience (0 = 0 to 5, 1 = 6 to 10, 2 = 11 to 15, 3 = 16 to 20, 4 = 21 to 25, 5 = 26+); Military Service (0 = Yes, 1 = No);
Training (0 = Traditional, 1 = Community Policing).
* p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 14 presents the zero-order correlation coefficients between the five
subscales of the Information Sharing Survey and the Support Scale.
Table 14
Zero-Order Intercorrelation Matrix for All Subscale Items and the Support for
Information Sharing Subscale (N = 408)

Variable
Trust
Internal influence

Trust

Internal
influence

—

.078
—

Community
policing

External
influence

Complexity

Support
.084

.078

.237**

.018

.163**

.108*

-.018

.144**
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Table 14 (continued).

Variable
Community policing
External influence
Complexity

Trust

Internal
influence

Community
policing

External
influence

Complexity

Support

—

.114*

-.102*

.389**

—

.090

.187**

—

Support

.065
—

* p < .05. ** p < .01.

An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation was derived in two
steps using the support subscale as the dependent variables and gender,
education level, years of experience, military service, and training type as the
independent variables in the first step. This multimodel method allows for the
statistical control of these demographic variables when evaluating the subscale
scores. The trust, internal influence, community policing, external influence, and
complexity subscales were entered in the second step. Initial collinearity
diagnostics suggested that rank, age, and years of experience were collinear.
The most cogent factor was the participants’ overall years of experience. Thus,
the final analysis includes years of experience, but does not include rank or age.
Based on the strength of the correlations provided in Table 12 and Table 13 and
examination of collinearity statistics, it was determined that no other serious
collinearity issues existed within the data. The regression results are presented in
Table 15.
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Table 15
OLS Regression Solutions Predicting Support for Information Sharing (N = 408)

Model I

Model II

Variable

b

S.E.

β

b

S.E.

β

Constant

20.235

.263

—

9.697

1.187

—

Gender

-.408

.356

-.057

-.383

.325

-.053

Education level

-.066

.080

-.040

-.092

.073

-.056

.276

.064

.227

.059

-.048

.224

-.011

-.088

.205

-.019

Training type

.363

.211

.084

.319

.197

.074

Trust

—

—

—

.005

.028

.008

Internal

—

—

—

.065

.038

.080

—

—

—

.451

.058

.358**

—

—

—

.105

.043

.113*

—

—

—

.093

.047

.088*

Experience
Military service

.212**

.174**

influence
Community
policing
External
influence
Complexity
R2
2

Adjusted R
F

.057

.227

.045

.207

4.811

11.615

ΔR2 = .170. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

The first model, which contained only the demographic characteristics of
the participants, explained only 5.7% of the variance in support for information
sharing. When controlling for these demographic characteristics, the Support for
Information Sharing Scale accounted for an additional 17% of the variance, for a
total of 22.7% of the variance explained.
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Among the demographic variables, the only significant indicator of support
for information sharing was the level of experience of the responding officer. As
previously discussed, this measure was heavily collinear with the age of the
responding officer as well as the officer’s rank. For this reason, those particular
variables were not included in the regression analysis. Of the five survey
subscales, Trust and Internal Influence were not statistically significant.
Community Policing, External Influence, and Complexity were all statistically
significant. Thus, the best predictors of support for information sharing were the
number of years of experience that an officer has, the officer’s level of support for
community policing, the officer’s perception of external influences on
departmental policy, and the complexity of how information is shared.
Specifically, officers that supported the community policing philosophy were more
likely to support information sharing. This was the single best predictor of support
for information sharing (β = .358). Additionally, the more perceived influence that
outside forces have on an officer’s department, the more likely the officer is to
support information sharing.
Discussion
Hypotheses
H1:

There is a significant linear relationship between the gender of a
police officer and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not support a
relationship between gender and police officer support for information sharing.
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H2:

There is a significant relationship between race and police officer
support of information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest a
relationship between race and support for information sharing.
H3:

There is a significant linear relationship between the educational
level of police officers and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not support a
relationship between the educational level of police officers and support for
information sharing.
H4:

There is a significant linear relationship between the experience of
police officers and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The data supports a relationship
between the experience level of a police officer and support for information
sharing. That is, older, more experienced police officers tend to support
information sharing.
H5:

There is a significant linear relationship between prior military
service of police officers and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not support a
relationship between prior military service by a police officer and support for
information sharing.
H6:

There is a significant linear relationship between the type of training
police officers receive and support for information sharing.
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Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not show a
relationship between the type of training and support for information sharing.
H7:

There is a significant relationship between the size of a police
department and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest a
relationship between the size of a police department and support for information
sharing.
H8:

There is a significant linear relationship between support for
community policing and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The regression analysis indicated
that there is a linear relationship between support for community policing and
information sharing. That is, police officers who tend to support community
policing also tend to support information sharing.
H9:

There is a significant linear relationship between the complexity of
communication tasks and support for information sharing.

Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The regression analysis indicated
that there is a linear relationship between the perceived complexity of tasks and
support for information sharing.
H10: There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of
external influence and support for information sharing.
Result: The null hypothesis is rejected. The more external influence is
perceived to play a role by police officers, the more officers tend to support
information sharing.

105
H11: There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of
internal influence and support for information sharing.
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest that
there is a relationship between perceptions of internal influence and support of
information sharing.
H12: There is a significant linear relationship between perceptions of
trust between federal and local police agencies and support for
information sharing.
Result: The null hypothesis is retained. The data does not suggest that
there is a relationship between perceptions of trust between federal and local law
enforcement and support for information sharing.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
A review of the available literature suggests intelligence information
sharing is a valuable tool for law enforcement to adequately protect the United
States from a future domestic terrorist attack. A thorough examination on the
topic of information sharing reveals successful communicative initiatives with
intrinsic benefits for all department and agencies involved in the programs.
Because homeland security was not considered a law enforcement priority
before the 9/11 attacks, few studies existed on the topic of information sharing.
The present study attempts to contribute to the literature by facilitating the
discussion of a unified strategy to intelligence information sharing among all
levels of law enforcement. The present study contributes to overcoming the
substantial obstacles by revealing barriers to information sharing as well as
identifying areas of support from local law enforcement.
Several respondent characteristics located in the demographic portion of
the survey stood out as beneficial to the potential enhancement of
comprehensive intelligence information sharing initiatives. First, the education
level of police officers, as indicated by respondents in the study, is clearly rising.
In the present study, 62% of the respondents possessed a college degree or
higher, compared to the 45% average across the United States (U.S. Department
of Labor, 2010). Select precincts within large city respondents reported 100% of
the police officers surveyed possessed bachelor’s degrees with an additional 5%
also having graduated with a master’s degree.
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Secondly, an examination of all four departments revealed that law
enforcement is clearly an occupation that is becoming more professionalized with
a comprehensive list of minimal standards, which must be met before
employment. Education (including training) is undoubtedly one of the core
requirements emphasized across the country. The education statistics presented
clearly have positive implications for modern 21st century police tactics, including
the development and enhancement of future information sharing
initiatives. Without the proper education and training, officers will not be able to
keep pace with the technological as well as tactical expertise needed to
implement comprehensive information sharing initiatives.
In the present study, a majority of the respondents believed operating a
computer was a simple skill to master. This response was an indication that
police officers are becoming more comfortable with the utilization of modern
technology in their jobs. The fact all four of the respondent departments currently
utilize laptop computers in their patrol cars represents the increasing familiarity of
incorporating technology into modern police practices. The utilization of laptops
by local patrolman is a critical first step in the process of sharing information, so
the familiarity and comfort level, as well as the desire to learn new technologies
as they become available, are critical to the advancement of information sharing
moving forward.
The demographic portion of the survey also revealed older officers are
more likely to support information sharing than younger officers. This was not a
surprise when viewed in context with the final qualitative question of the survey.
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Although it would make sense that younger police officers would embrace the
more technological aspects of the information sharing process, several older
officers, as referenced by their qualitative responses, clearly saw themselves as
Maynard-Moody and Musheno coined, citizen agents. That is, in the final years of
their careers as police, helping people tended to give more experienced police
officers more job satisfaction than arresting people.
A north respondent with 27 years of experience wrote simply, “At this point
in my career, I am on the job solely to help people and help solve community
problems” (J. Webster, personal communication, February 10, 2010). The police
chief of the south region stated,
I know this is a generalization, but the younger guys prefer to kick down
doors and crack heads and make cases that involve excitement and help
advance their careers. The older guys tend to prefer the camaraderie
associated with working together on a case for a common purpose. I know
the older guys enjoy attending the training seminars more than the
younger guys. It’s like a reunion for the older guys, they become
reacquainted with officers from other departments from prior cases, they
swap stories, and sometimes those prior working relationships lead to the
making of future cases. (W. Payne, personal communication, November
14, 2009)
The community policing variable contained within the survey was the
group of questions that had the greatest significance. While it cannot be
scientifically concluded that support of community policing tenets will
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automatically support information sharing initiatives, it does suggest that officers
overwhelmingly support and are interested in the expansion and training of
proactive police tactics, including technology, of which information sharing is a
component.
There was no statistical significance between officers who learned a
community policing curriculum in basic training and officers who were taught a
traditional curriculum in basic training as it relates to the support of information
sharing. However, officers of both training methods overwhelmingly placed their
support in the proactive police practices that comprise information sharing. This
survey result would indicate, as Lipsky (1980) stated in Street-level Bureaucracy:
Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, that all service delivery by a public
servant is provided intrinsically and is fundamentally both “immediate and
personal” to the individual public servant providing the service (p. 8). Therefore,
the establishment of comprehensive information sharing is literally a battle of the
hearts and minds of all local police officers. Line-officers are the public service
workers who are entrusted both at the beginning of the communication network
and for follow-up investigation. Line officer support is imperative for efficient
service delivery in this area of law enforcement.
The significance of the external pressure variable demonstrates both
opportunities and barriers which confront local and federal agencies working
together on joint task force cases or on the continued development of
interoperable communication networks. Police administrative leadership on both
sides will be needed if information sharing initiatives are to continue and expand.
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The present study indicates both sides are influenced by each other and can
benefit from each agency’s resources and expertise in strategic joint investigative
areas.
Local agencies clearly benefit from the budgetary resources that federal
agencies possess. Local police departments working together with federal
agencies can provide the resources and additional manpower that local
departments often need to bring a complex case to a successful
conclusion. Federal agencies need the informants and inherent knowledge of the
area that local agencies possess. However, there remains the traditional
territorial problems and trust issues, such as which agency gets the credit for a
successful case, that has traditionally plagued police working within the federated
system of law enforcement.
Police organizational leaders demonstrate to rank and file officers the
importance in this specific area by the priority of enforcement placed on
information sharing within the department. Akbulut (2003) labeled this leadership
technique as providing agency championship within a department; that is,
promoting an environment committed to the introduction and implementation of
selected new initiatives. While agency championship does not necessarily have
to be initiated by an organizational leader, it follows a police chief or supervisor
will have the best chance of success in an organizational hierarchy which is flat
compared to other professional organizations and also possesses a strict chain
of command.
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Implications
The implications of the research suggest law enforcement must be more
inclusive, uniform, and at the same time open to creative solutions in order to
meet the increased demands for security in the terrorist age. Local law
enforcement respondents in all geographic regions are open to participation in
future partnerships with state and federal agencies. Local police officers in all
regions view information sharing as not only a valuable investigative tool but also
as an additional opportunity to network with other police officers, which could
lead to career advancement opportunities. Local officers view information sharing
as an opportunity to make more money, gain experience, and an opportunity to
break away from the mundane daily tasks that traditionally occupy the majority of
their time.
Many local officers also view information and joint technology sharing as
a cornerstone for proactive policing practices. This study suggests information
sharing programs can be utilized both within current traditional police systems as
well as within community policing organizational models. The local police officers’
overwhelming support of proactive police tactics suggests the possibility of
expansion of information sharing programs within the community policing model.
The community policing model may prove to be preferable as programs could be
implemented and expanded based on already established policing programs,
which currently possess the support of the community.
The final question of the survey questionnaire asked respondents what
they believe to be the most prominent barrier or barriers to information sharing.
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The two most significant barriers were a lack of trust between local and federal
officers as well as a lack of compatibility of protocols—procedures between local
and federal law enforcement agencies. Respondents listed “egos” or “issues of
delegating credit for successful investigations” as the next most prevalent barrier.
Another barrier listed was a lack of cooperation and unresponsiveness of federal
agencies. Also, another barrier listed was the failure of time-sensitive information
to be shared in a manner that enabled officers to immediately investigate and
follow-up on the information shared, including classified issues of which
individuals were entitled to receive the information. Cost issues were also listed
as a serious concern. The problem of interoperability, that is, the lack of one
database which can be accessed and shared over all levels of law enforcement
was an additional barrier. Bureaucracy or too much red tape was the next barrier
listed by respondents. Finally, competition for funds, failure to embrace
organizational change, and more important and better things to do were listed as
barriers by at least one respondent of the survey.
The barriers listed by survey respondents fell into two categories. First,
officers discussed the overall difficulty and complexity of the problem of sharing
information on a national level and, from some respondents, from the local to
local level. The process of organizing large amounts of police officers from
different jurisdictions in all parts of the country to work together for a common
purpose is difficult under the most favorable conditions. All four departments
studied agreed the process itself is nearly impossible to operationalize. As one
respondent from the south region stated, “the bad guys only have to be right
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once, we (in our response effort) need to be right every time.” Local officers
stated it is difficult enough to share information within their own region. One
officer stated, “I barely know what is going on across the river in my own district,
much less with the feds. I feel fortunate if I can get a timely response from a local
all-points bulletin that is issued.”
One north respondent stated that the compatibility issues between federal
and local police agencies are complicated because federal law enforcement
agencies are formulated as large, transient agencies, which are almost
exclusively organized to conduct large-scale investigations. By contrast, local
police agencies are primarily concerned with efficiently managing calls for service
and addressing the problems of their community based, in part, on complaints of
the citizens residing within their district. A north respondent believes differences
in agency missions ultimately cause federal and local law enforcement to be
incompatible. However, the same north respondent wrote,
What will continue to draw the two sides together is the fact the leaders of
local police agencies want the grant money and access to potentially
unlimited resources the feds have to offer, while the feds want access to
informants and information that local police officers inherently possess.
For that reason, I believe the two levels of law enforcement officers will
continue to work together, largely because they need each other in order
to achieve their respective agency missions.
The second barrier to information sharing lies in the entrenched territorial
nature, which has been pervasive in police culture over the last century. The
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culture barrier presents a more difficult challenge because it involves a negative
aspect of police culture that has become more pervasive over time. Respondents
in all parts of the country repeat the barriers of territoriality and distrust as severe
barriers to intelligence information sharing. A 30-year veteran of the north
department stated,
There had to be a traumatic event such as 9/11, which unequivocally
forces different jurisdictions and departments to work together for a
common purpose. The government is largely a slow, reactive animal. The
public outcry needs to be deafening on this issue, and the problem must
also gain the support of the political administration in power, or it’s never
going to happen on a large enough scale to prevent another serious attack
from taking place. (J. Webster, personal communication, February 10,
2010)
Another north respondent stated,
During my tenure as a police officer there has been a steady decline in our
relations with federal government dating back to the war on drugs in the
1980s, when crack cocaine first appeared like a plague on our city streets.
One problem was the agents on the federal level assigned to the task
forces were from other parts of the country. The individual federal agents
were not bad people, and the distrust was not personally directed, but we
knew the feds would be transferred in a couple of years to a different city
within the agency. For the feds, it worked as a rotational system similar to
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the military. Each field agent would spend a three-year rotation and then
would be transferred in a few years with a promotion.
In terms of the actual investigations, the feds depend heavily on our
department for informants, which provided critical information on suspects
and potential large buys, which was what the feds were primarily
concerned with. However, the organizational structure was predicated on
large, far-reaching investigations based on large buys which lead to
multiple arrests were not possible without the information provided by our
department. Local police officers are the primary brokers of information in
their individual precincts. There is no exclusive federal territory per se; the
feds operate in our territory. The local police officers have a monopoly on
informants. The officers in my precinct knew all of the players in our city;
we knew their tendencies, we even knew a lot of the time where and when
the big deals would go down. Even so, it was difficult to coordinate with
federal agents. (J. Burke, personal communication, December 22, 2010)
Respondents from all regions cited a lack of sharing credit for large busts
helped create the distrust between the two levels of law enforcement.
The feds would swoop in at the last second, use our information gathered
through months, sometimes years of investigative street work, use our
manpower for support, and then take the credit for the arrest and receive a
promotion. Our guys resented this situation, and the process was
repeated over and over during my time at the department. The ego
situation heightened the resentment from the local to the federal level. The
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hostility grew to the point where we didn’t want to work with the feds on
any level, regardless of the type or political importance placed on the
investigation.
We prided ourselves on doing a good job working together, even though
we didn’t always share information effectively within our own department,
much less the feds, we didn’t think we were above doing the dirty work.
Generally speaking, federal agents are not expected to make the amount
of quality arrests local police officers do if they want to get promoted. I
don’t believe the feds possess the investigative skill as local officers
simply because they do not handle a large volume of cases. When you
handle a large amount of cases you learn to be efficient, including in your
communication with other police officers. One of my favorite moments of
my career was when the lead federal prosecutor called me into his office
with the Attorney General and a couple of FBI men present to discuss an
important case that we were working with the feds. The federal prosecutor
turned to the attorney general and said, ‘I want you to see what a real
police officer who does real police work looks like.’
The south police chief agreed and wrote,
Our relationship with the feds has had a history of conflict, with the feds
coming into our territory and promoting their agenda. Over a period of
time, a climate of distrust has developed, which has been extremely
difficult to undo. However, before we get into counterterrorism issues we
need to solve some of the ego, territorial issues situations, such as which
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federal agencies and local departments are going to run the investigations
so credit can be shared. There are still tremendous ego problems over
control of counterterrorism investigations and confusion over how the
information should be shared.
The same south respondent explained the effect of power that political
agendas can have on the priorities and direction of federal and local law
enforcement.
On the federal level, the President dictates to law enforcement agencies
the problems which need to be addressed and solved. Since 9/11,
President George W. Bush has obviously made counterterrorism a priority.
President Bush created a new federal agency devoted to counterterrorism
at a great economic and political expense. I believe preceding presidents
did not adequately address this issue because there was not a domestic
attack on their watch.
When I was in the prime of my career the issue was drugs.
President Carter had more pressing domestic concerns with an economic
recession, inflation, and gas shortages. Then President Reagan was
elected and declared war on drugs. After President Reagan’s antidrug
declaration, those were some of the busiest years on the force, and the
time in which my colleagues and I had the heaviest caseload and contact
with federal agencies. (J. Burke, personal communication, December 22,
2010)
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Another complaint of local law enforcement was the unresponsiveness of
federal agencies when local officers attempted to share information or requested
information. An officer in the east region stated,
I don’t think the lack of information sharing is as much about malfeasance
with their agency as it is about nonfeasance. Our department reaches out
from time to time but we don’t get a response. I believe that the feds need
some type of pressing personal interest in working with our department or
it will never happen. (T. Goldberg, personal communication, March 9,
2011)
A north respondent stated,
I remember when we received a notice from the Homeland Security
Department that they were going to make an inspection of some
dangerous chemicals located on the corporate campus of a Fortune 500
company within our jurisdictional boundaries. Members of the company
were founders of our local police charity, and our department supervisors
were nervous about a surprise inspection by the feds, which could cause
the company involved to lose millions of dollars for being shut down for
even a half of a day. Even though the feds were the agency to originally
contact our department, they failed to show up for the inspection for over
thirteen months after they originally stated an inspection would take place.
We spoke with three different teams of agents and two different
supervisors throughout the ordeal and we never received a satisfactory
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response from any of them. (J. Burke, personal communication,
December 22, 2010)
Another north respondent wrote,
I remember a couple of years ago, I was assigned to a protective detail
which involved the first ladies motorcade. I discovered through a routine
check on the FBI’s watch list that the motorcade was to travel directly in
front of two houses that were currently occupied by suspected
international terrorists. I called the FBI first, since it was their watch list to
confirm the information, but never heard back from them. In the meantime
(less than forty-eight hours later), I was called by the secret service telling
me the route had been changed. I can only deduce that either the secret
service found out that the suspected terrorists lived in the area and
changed the route, and the FBI just sat on the information, or the FBI
called the secret service, and left our department out of the loop entirely.
Either way, this does not speak very highly of the FBI’s ability or desire to
share information with other need-to-know agencies.
Limitations of the Study
Additional studies are necessary in order to advance the body of research
in an area vital to the future security of the United States. The opportunities to
address the barriers associated with the potential development of comprehensive
intelligence information sharing are limitless in scope. The present study is
intended to serve as a beginning for future research using local police to examine
some of the barriers to information sharing, but limitations within the present
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study exist. Recommendations for future study are based upon research topics
which were outside the parameters of this study but are integral to the
advancement of future information sharing initiatives.
First, future effort to expand this research should be conducted with the
inclusion of more cities, which would provide greater geographic representation,
generalizability, and enhance the sample size of officers participating in the
study. Although great effort was made by this researcher to include four distinct
geographic regions of the United States, expansion of cities would drastically
enhance the study. Modifications also should be made to the survey instrument
in order to raise the response rate. The number of pages in the survey instrument
should be reduced in order to attract more respondents by the visual appearance
of a shorter survey.
Second, a thorough examination of the barriers to information sharing
should include an examination of economic factors, which would affect the
implementation of information sharing initiatives. However, in this study, the
variable of cost was eliminated due to the fact that street-level police officers
were the primary respondents of the study. Typically, street-level officers do not
make budgetary decisions, and, therefore, it was not practical to include costs in
a study comprised primarily of rank-and-file police officers. However, cost issues
of all types may, in fact, be the most critical barrier to interoperable information
sharing. Certainly, cost issues need to be included, if possible, in future studies.
Finally, federal law enforcement personnel were exempt from participation
in this study because of a lack of access by this researcher to the sample
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population. Federal agents would have been useful because counterterrorism
mandates, including the creation of the Homeland Security Department, were
initiated on the federal level. The 9/11 Commission stated the federal
government and its law enforcement agents were the level of government
ultimately responsible for the implementation of all counterterrorism programs. In
light of these facts, future studies, including federal law enforcement, would
provide valuable additions to the literature.
Recommendations for Future Research
Recommended topics for future researchers as it relates to the present
study is to reconcile the discrepancy between the quantitative and qualitative
results of the trust variable. The quantitative portion of the study revealed no
significance between trust of officers in other departments and willingness to
support intelligence information sharing initiatives. However, in the open-ended
question at the conclusion of the survey, police officers listed a lack of trust of
police officers in other departments as well as their own as a primary barrier to
sharing information. The reconciliation of this discrepancy would provide a better
understanding of the realities of everyday practice of law enforcement which
serve as barriers to efficient information sharing.
Future studies in regard to the present study are needed, which focus on
the specific factors as to why older officers are more likely to support information
sharing initiatives than younger officers. Additional information would be useful to
police chiefs as they select members for future joint task forces, not only in terror
cases but in other areas of law enforcement where task forces are utilized, such
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as guns, gangs, and drugs. In the past, task force investigations have been
successful because of the ability to merge resources as well as to utilize the best
investigative attributes each agency or department has to offer. Additional
knowledge in this research area would potentially expand the utilization of task
forces in law enforcement.
The 9/11 terrorist attack on New York City reinforced the need for review
of all practical and strategic counterterrorism processes for the implementation of
a unified enterprise architecture for the purpose of the creation of a single
interoperable information sharing network. Government accountability reports
continue to suggest that much work remains on the federal level to initiate and
maintain the level of information communication needed to prevent future attacks
(GAO, 2002a). Additional research would analyze the most effective proposal
initiatives and examine whether the newly proposed initiatives could be
realistically and uniformly adopted by federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies. Recommendations for future study are based upon research topics
that fell outside the parameters of this study but are integral to the advancement
of future information sharing initiatives. Recommendations were made in
consultation with appropriate literature, the 9/11 Commission Report (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004), the Heritage Foundation report (The
Heritage Foundation, 2005), and the Final Report of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
(H.R. No. 109-377, 2006).
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Future studies that examine the bureaucratic tendencies of federal state
and local law enforcement are critical to accurately assessing the benefits and
risks of all proposed initiatives. Studies that examine the impact of proposed
federal government initiatives are recommended because the process of
reorganization, even though originating a decade ago, remains fluid and
complex. Scholarly studies that examine government bureaucracies are useful in
determining the protocols of government operations. The results of future studies
will indicate which proposals have the best opportunity for implementation and
long-term success. Since 2001, federal government bureaucracies, including law
enforcement, have evolved and reorganized on such large scales that further
examination of methods and processes is needed.
Specifically, future studies are needed that examine aspects of the United
States federated system of government, which encompasses law enforcement.
The hierarchical nature of government bureaucracies presents a severe barrier in
the development of comprehensive interoperable information sharing systems.
The federated structure of the United States government has affected the
efficiency and quality of participation of local law enforcement in regard to
counterterrorism investigations. This approach has resulted in a lack of
coordination from a communicative standpoint between all levels of law
enforcement. Furthermore, organizational structure has created future barriers to
implementation on the local law enforcement level regarding counterterrorism
challenges. The challenges range from a lack of opportunity to take part and
receive credit for participation in federally-dominated counterterrorism
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investigations to a lack of resources or the lack of a local organizational structure,
which could adequately support counterterrorism police services.
From an organizational standpoint, the federated structure impacts the
flow of communication, because information generates from the top to the bottom
in the chain of command bureaucracy. The typical government agency in the
United States (including law enforcement agencies) have been organized
through decentralized stove-pipe organizational structures created as a
component of the 1940s post-World War II government. Vertical governmental
departments were created to oversee every task and service of an agency with
limited capacity for communicative collaboration. As noted in the 9/11
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
2004), prior to 9/11, the intelligence information flow was woefully decentralized,
with disparate pieces of intelligence scattered nationally throughout the United
States. Therefore, it is critical that future studies are conducted which follow the
information sharing process from the federal to the local levels and analyze the
efficiency as well as administrative delay in the old systems as compared to the
new systems.
Bardach (2001) noted that many proposals which outline future counter
terrorism protocol lacked clarity and cohesion. Bardach stated past proposals
were typically fundamentally incompatible with the Department of Homeland
Security’s emphasis on inter agency collaboration and networking. The
potentially catastrophic and unpredictable nature of events involved in terrorist
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attacks, combined with the bureaucratic barriers involved in government
hierarchy make information sharing extremely difficult. These forces in interaction
with traditional police culture are antithetical to the successes of future
information sharing programs. Successful processes comprise the fundamental
core of interpretative communication. The processes are found in the concepts of
efficiency, equality and adaptability.
Additional studies should be examined with the goal of determining
agency counterterrorism duties of all law enforcement agencies responsible
(particularly on the federal level) for domestic counterterrorism operations. The
roles and responsibilities for core federal agencies involved in counterterrorism
efforts since 9/11 remain in the process of clarification. The Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and
Federal Bureau of Investigation continue to reorganize their own agencies as
well as prioritize operational duties in regard to key terrorism functions. The prior
establishment of working relationships in regard to the reorganization of duties on
the federal level is fundamental to the establishment of future information sharing
initiatives with local law enforcement. Future studies, which examine the
reorganization strategies of federal law enforcement, need to focus on the goals
of organizational investigative efficiency while eliminating organizational and
investigative specific redundancies (The Heritage Foundation, 2005).
Specifically, studies that examine the future role of the FBI in relation to
its newly formed domestic terrorism partnership with the Department of
Homeland Security are needed. The FBI was created to be a lead investigative
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agency, structured to oversee all aspects of the investigate process, including the
control and dissemination of sensitive information. Since 9/11, the FBI must fully
integrate 28,000 employees and 56 field offices concerning the investigative
responsibility on domestic terrorism with the Homeland Security Department and
its merger of its 22 agencies. The FBI cannot effectively lead the domestic
intelligence effort without other federal agencies, but the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security could help achieve this goal if the two
agencies could efficiently coordinate domestic terrorism functions and
responsibilities (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 424).
The FBI does not possess the capacity to investigate cases at a state and
local level with the responsibilities it now has at the federal level regarding
homeland security. For example, state police organizations could be encouraged
to coordinate resources on kidnapping cases, and full responsibility for
enforcement of drug laws could be transferred to the bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
This proposal would decrease the FBI’s participation in state and local task
forces cases, with a greater emphasis placed on domestic terrorism
investigations (The Heritage Foundation, 2005). A comprehensive plan that
assigns roles and missions to the relevant authorities must also be developed
and adopted on all levels of law enforcement (Calfano, 2001, p. 16).
Without clearly defined roles, federal government agencies will have
difficulty delegating investigative responsibilities while maintaining viable working
relationships with state and local law enforcement. The confusion over federal
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guidance mandates serves as a barrier to information sharing, because the
mandates unilaterally prioritize which elements should be implemented. The
result has been each state and local municipality has been left to develop their
own counterterrorism strategy. This approach has resulted in a predictably
confusing and redundant course of action. Scholars with the assistance of
information technology experts, all levels of law enforcement, government
planners, and local citizen groups can contribute to the process with the benefit
of taking the best suggestions for implementation contained within each study. In
this manner the most promising suggestions can be combined into a nationally
integrated information sharing plan.
Scholarly studies that examine benchmark attributes of prior successful
program development need to be analyzed by the Homeland Security
Department going forward in a proactive attempt to improve counterterrorism
strategy. For example, benchmarking of program development styles previously
implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of
Health and Human Services regarding other terrorist strategies would be
beneficial. Waugh and Strieb (2006) noted the reactive paradigm employed in
emergency-management procedures: “Policies and programs have been
instituted and implemented in the aftermath of a disaster, based almost solely on
that disaster experience and with little investment in capacity building to deal with
the next disaster” (p. 137). Waugh and Strieb’s rethinking of emergency
management protocols should become a research priority, specifically focusing
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on a comprehensive plan including interoperable information sharing across all
levels of law enforcement.
Coordination planning between the public and private sectors also is
necessary in order to develop a comprehensive homeland security program. A
triangular organizational structure of checks and balances must be developed
among the government, the private-sector, and the public. The United States
government must assure citizens and private industry alike that, while it
recognizes the responsibility of managing homeland security, it still needs the
help of its citizens in order to be successful. An example of an opportunity to
merge the two agencies for the purposes of security could be found in the risk
assessment process. Risk-assessment studies are designed to prioritize and
protect the most vulnerable areas in a potential terrorist attack.
Risk benefit priorities should be determined through a cost-benefit
analysis, which calculates potential positive outcomes against the risks involved
in inadequately securing a target. Accurate assessments of the security of public
infrastructure are an example of a cost-benefit analysis. Additional studies are
recommended, in part because of the existence of budgetary constraints, and
areas deemed the most vulnerable (large, coastal, metropolitan areas) need to
be given priority. For example, urban areas in the vicinity of nuclear power plants;
dams; electricity systems; and oil and gas delivery, storage, and refinement
systems must be a top strategic priority (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks, 2004, p. 428; The Heritage Foundation, 2005).
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Additional studies are needed to examine the direct and latent costs of
implementing homeland security policy, particularly in the areas of grants and
oversight at the federal level. Homeland security assistance should be delegated
based solely on the assessment of risks and vulnerabilities, not on a general
revenue-sharing model (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 396).
Difficult choices have not been made involving the allocation of limited resources
in an era of both decreasing public revenues and available law enforcement
manpower. Scholars and government administrators need to analyze, identify,
and rank critical national security assets to ensure the most important and
vulnerable targets are protected. A comprehensive plan which assigns strategic
missions to the relevant authorities must also be developed across all levels of
government (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 391).
A scholarly assessment of grant programs and oversight are critical to the
implementation of information sharing programs because grants are the
preferred transfer method of government funds from the federal government to
state and local law enforcement. First, studies which examine the lack of
preparedness standards increase the difficulty for scholars to accurately measure
gaps in first responder (including law enforcement) capabilities. The Department
of Homeland Security has not developed sufficient benchmarks that could be
utilized to determine whether preparedness standards are being met, to establish
and examine future goals, or to determine whether the grants received by state
and local police departments are being efficiently allocated. Additionally, federal
research could determine whether state and local law enforcement, which
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comprise the majority of first responders, have the funds available and are able
to efficiently target priority areas for which the grants were intended.
No established process exists for collecting data on the amounts of first
responder grants available assessed by each state and local agency. Accurate
grant assessment plans would provide scholars and government officials with
reliable data to determine future budgets and establish effective oversight,
analyze gaps, and access progress toward the achievement of future goals. The
GAO (2002b) reported difficulty in determining the results and establishing
baseline data to access future strategic priorities. One GAO (2002c) study
indicated a high percentage of grant money was spent on equipment, planning,
and training, including all types of emergency exercises, such as biological terror
and natural disasters. On a micro level, future studies that track data are needed
in order to follow allocated government funds throughout the grant cycle. Many
grants were unable to be studied and tracked because some grants were
earmarked to state and local governments, while others were allocated directly to
state and local law enforcements and first responders (GAO, 2002c).
The development of an effective interoperable communication system is a
critical element of any new counterterrorism policy. Critical to the achievement of
interoperability is the implementation of seamless communicative strategies that
result in the most effective and efficient sharing of information between all levels
of law enforcement. Interoperability allows first responders the ability to share
information in real-time and on demand through wireless communication as
needed and authorized. Interoperability allows the strategic opportunity for all
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participating law enforcement agencies and first responders on all levels of
government to communicate and work together. Current interagency
communication systems make information sharing difficult. At the same time,
changes in existing procedures must be universally adopted, or they will not be
effective.
Kiernan (2003) stated communications interoperability was an
acknowledged operational deficiency in counterterrorism strategy. First
responder command and control practices were previously structured around
providing tactical support for the incident commander with little or no coordination
and collaboration outside the immediate area impacted by the immediate
emergency area. Communication interoperability and common operating
platforms can no longer be viewed as beneficial by-products; they must become
fundamental requirements (J. Booth, personal communication, December 14,
2002 as cited in Kiernan, 2003).
There continues to be considerable scholarly interest in the exploration of
how increased communicative efficiency can be used to promote future
information sharing initiatives (including interoperability) among agencies in the
common mission of protecting the United States. The benefits of sharing
information have proven through prior scholarly research to be too strategically
valuable to be ignored. Research has shown that increased interest among local
law enforcement has the potential to increase the productivity and performance
of all law enforcement agencies, as well as improve operational efficiency, and
provide better police services to all citizens.
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Because the barriers to efficient information sharing (including
interoperability) are so numerous, the opportunities for future research in this
area could realistically occupy and engage scholars for generations. Although
this study focused on the barriers to implementation on the local levels, further
research and analysis concerning the federal government’s role in the
implementation of new strategies and protocol needs to be explored. The
implementation of future strategies remains fluid, and both original and replicate
research concerning the development of such processes are both timely and
necessary moving forward.

133
APPENDIX A
INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY

INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY
The purpose of this survey is to identify the barriers to intelligence information sharing
perceived by local law enforcement and to develop strategies that can be used to overcome
these barriers. This survey will help local law enforcement voice their concerns, issues, and
expectations about participating in intelligence information sharing initiatives.
The survey will take approximately ten minutes to complete. All individual responses will
remain strictly confidential; only summary statistics will be recorded. You are guaranteed
anonymity. No one but the researchers will have access to these responses, and your
identity will not be linked to this record. However, if for any reason you do not want to
answer any or all of the items below, you can refrain from doing so. If you believe you
cannot answer any of the questions honestly, please do not answer them at all. If you can
answer all of the items, it will be very helpful. We are grateful for your cooperation.
Please return the completed survey to
or Scott Bransford, conductor of the study, at the address below. If you have any
questions about the survey, please do not hesitate to contact Scott Bransford at any of the
numbers listed below.

Scott D. Bransford
Doctoral Student
University of Southern Mississippi
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART I
Please circle the appropriate background information which best describes you.

A.

Your gender:

B.

Your race/ethnicity:

C.

Your age group:

D.

Highest level of education you have attained:

High School

Male

Female
White

20-30

Black

31-40

Bachelor’s

41-50

Master’s

Hispanic
51-60

Number of years experience as a law enforcement officer:
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25

F.

Have you served in the military:

G.

Type of training curriculum: Traditional
Unknown

H.

Your rank:

Patrol Officer

YES

Corporal

61+

Doctorate

E.
0-5

Other

Other

26+

NO

Community Policing

Sergeant

Other
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART II
Please rate the importance of achieving each of the following benefits of electronic
information sharing in terms of your agency’s decisions whether or not to participate in
electronic information sharing with federal agencies. For each item below, please place a
checkmark in the box that best describes your view.

STATEMENT

If I were appointed the chief
administrator of my agency, I
would be willing to allocate
additional resources to
sharing information.
If I were appointed the chief
administrator of my agency, I
would place a priority on
information sharing training
with other law enforcement
agencies.
If I were appointed the chief
administrator of my agency, I
would be willing to spend a
large amount of time to learn
a new computer system
format, which has the
potential to provide useful
investigative information.
Sharing information would be
easier and more efficient if
there was one database which
could be accessed from all
departments, across all levels
of law enforcement.

UNIMPORTANT

OF LITTLE
IMPORTANCE

NEUTRAL

IMPORTANT

VERY
IMPORTANT
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART III
Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each of the following
statements.
For each statement below, please place a checkmark in the box that best describes your view.

STATEMENT

Information obtained from
citizens is critical to good police
work.
Cooperation with other agencies
is critical to good police work.
I sometimes need access to
information during the course of
an investigation that I know other
law enforcement agencies have.
I believe preventing crimes is just
as important as solving crimes.
I believe that solving problems in
the community is an important
part of police work.
The attack of 9/11 has increased
the need for better
communication between all levels
of law enforcement.
I believe the overall benefits of
sharing information outweigh the
negatives.
Federal agencies have suggested
that our agency share intelligence
information electronically.
Our agency has been criticized by
other law enforcement agencies
for our handling of information
during a joint investigation.
Federal agencies have had an
influence on our department’s
decision to share information with
other agencies.
Our agency has previously
accepted an invitation from a
federal agency to participate in a
joint training task force initiative.

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

DISAGREE

NEUTRAL

AGREE

STRONGLY
AGREE
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…Part III Continued
STATEMENT

Federal agencies keep our agency
informed about the downside of not
sharing information.
It is difficult to learn computer skills
necessary for sharing information
with other law enforcement agencies.
Electronic information sharing of
intelligence information is a difficult
concept to understand.
It is more difficult to share
information with other law
enforcement agencies, which do not
have the same standard operating
procedures as my agency.
Federal agencies and our agency have
a high level of mutual trust.
Federal agencies keep our agency’s
best interests in mind.
If my agency shared intelligence
information with a federal agency, I
am confident that the information
shared would not be compromised.
Pertinent information and
investigative assistance are encouraged
by my agency.
I would feel comfortable going
outside of my agency’s chain of
command if I believed I had
investigative information, which was
being ignored.
If I were appointed chief
administrator of my agency, I would
make information sharing a priority.

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

DISAGREE

NEUTRAL

AGREE

STRONGLY
AGREE
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INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART IV
In your opinion, what are the major barriers to successful intelligence information sharing
initiatives between local and federal agencies?
STATEMENT

STRONGLY
DISAGREE

DISAGREE

NEUTRAL

AGREE

STRONGLY
AGREE

I would be more likely to support
information sharing practices if I were
given greater flexibility by my
supervisor to conduct and share
information as the investigation
dictates.
I believe that learning and applying
intelligence information sharing
techniques is important for my career.
The time my supervisors make me
spend on tasks associated with
information sharing could be better
spent in other areas of law
enforcement.
My agency administrators make
information sharing a priority in my
department.
I would be more likely to support
increased information sharing if my
supervisor believed it was important.

INFORMATION SHARING SURVEY – PART V
In your opinion, what are the major barriers to the implementation of intelligence
information sharing initiatives between local, state, and federal agencies?

Thank you for your cooperation in completing this survey. If you believe there are any points of particular
interest to your agency concerning intelligence information sharing that this survey has failed to address, please
feel free to elaborate below.
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